[2 lines of source text not declassified] Remaining US forces would ultimately consist of headquarters staff, military advisers, and personnel in selected logistic units.

Our economic strategy will depend in some degree on which approach we choose in the security held. If we do not make an intensive effort to build up ROK military strength, but keep our forces in Korea somewhat longer, there will be less pressure on the ROK economy, and our economic aid can taper down more rapidly. If, as this paper recommends, we make the intensive effort, there may be corresponding strains on the ROK and our aid phase-out should probably be somewhat deferred. Moreover, there are still major uncertainties in the ROK's economic future and we should terminate Development Loans and Military Budget Support only after the critical presidential election of 1971.

We still have some influence on political decisions in Seoul, and we should retain the tools which give us that influence until the ROK is past the 1971 hurdle. We should recognize, however, that our position is already very different from that of some years ago and should not try to transform our old role as a flying instructor into that of a permanent copilot.

The major steps in carrying out the preferred strategy might look something like the following:

FY 1970. Return of one ROK division from Viet-Nam and phaseout of supporting assistance.

FY 1971. Return of remaining ROK troops from Viet-Nam, making possible the resumption of the MAP Transfer Program.

FY 1972. Development Loans and Military Budget Support phased out. Shift of MAP to soft-term credit sales begun. The US 2nd Division would be withdrawn from Korea. The UN Command might at this point relinquish operational control of ROK forces, except in emergencies.

FY 1973. PL 480 local currency sales ended and remaining PL 480 sales made on long-term dollar basis. The US 7th Division would be withdrawn from Korea.

FY 1974. PL 480 Title II program (rural development) ended.

FY 1975. Modernization of ROK military structure substantially completed. [2 line of source text not declassified]

All of these steps of course, depend to various degrees, on developments in the interim.

Several major questions may fairly be raised concerning the preferred strategy: Would the ROK accept it? Would it increase the risk of a ROK attempt to re-unify Korea by force? Could the required resources be found for the projected build-up of ROK defensive capabilities? And, finally, what about the Chinese threat?

Concerning the first question, ROK leaders will be unhappy over the withdrawal of the two US divisions and the prospect that other forces would eventually follow, but in time they would realize that they had no rational alternative but to go along.

The danger of a "March North" seems minimal: there are few fanatics among ROK leaders, and we can probably continue to rely on ROK dependence on US logistic support to inhibit any rash adventures. We should, however, support a primarily defensive posture for ROK forces, and we should continue to make clear that our guarantee does not apply to hostilities arising from ROK attack.

The resources problem may be the most difficult of all, but its solution would be facilitated after the end of major hostilities in VietNam by the withdrawal of the US divisions from Korea, which will result in very large savings and will more than offset the added expenditures required by the preferred strategy. Also, the ability of the ROK to pay for its own defense is increasing, modest amounts of non-lethal military assistance may be forthcoming from Japan, and any excess equipment after Viet-Nam would further reduce costs.

Fortunately, Chinese participation in a new attack seems unlikely, so long as the US maintains its present security commitment to the ROK, backed up by both a nuclear deterrent and the ability to deploy forces to Korea if the need arises. The strategy proposed here would increase the ROK's ability to fight a delaying action against a combined Chinese-North Korean attack, but even a very large build-up of ROK capabilities at great expense to both the US and the ROK could not eliminate the need for US combat forces.

No strategy is without its problems including the one advanced here. This strategy nevertheless offers the best hope of reducing our vulnerability to direct involvement in any new Korean war without making such a war any more likely than it is today. We would preserve our major interests in Korea while moving to a new relationship in which the ROK is no longer a dependent client but a full-fledged, selfreliant ally.

[Here follows the five-part study comprising 70 pages. Part I is entitled "US Interests and Objectives in Korea," Part II, "Major Problems in Korea Over the Next Decade," Part III, "Assessment of Strategic Alternatives," Part IV, "The Preferred Strategy," and Part V, "Recommendations." Also included were annexes A-F. Annex A is entitled "Present US Commitments," annex B, "Current US-Korean Relations," C, "Major Problems in the ROK," D, "North Korea's Prospects," E, "Reunification," and F, "Contingencies."]

202. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

Washington, June 19, 1968, 10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Clifford argues that we should not proceed with the dispatch of the 5,000 Korean civilians to Vietnam because of the high budgetary cost in allocating the equipment held on Okinawa to expedite the reequipment of the GVN forces. He also argues that to accept the civilians would make it more difficult to get the additional 6,000 combat troops which were to have been part of the 11,000 light division from Korea.

This item is on the lunch agenda today.

Walt

Attachment

Department of Defense Paper

Washington, June 18, 1968.

Additional ROK Deployments to Vietnam

Last fall, the South Korean Government agreed to deploy an additional light division to South Vietnam. They proposed to send 5,000 ROK civilians to replace an equal number of present support troops. In addition, 6,000 combat troops were to be sent to make up the light division total of 11,000.

During the conversations in Honolulu, President Park reaffirmed the commitment to supply additional combat forces but contended that it was not feasible for him to proceed to secure the National Assembly's support for this deployment at this time. He urged, however, that we go ahead with the deployment of 5,000 ROK civilians and the conversion of that number of ROK support forces to the combat role.

Intelligence reports indicate that Park's assessment of the political situation eliminates any chance that he will dispatch additional combat forces to Vietnam now or within the foreseeable future. However, the ROK Government continues to press us to agree that they should

1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Cambodia 5E(3), November 1968 to January 1969. Secret.

send the 5,000 civilians to Vietnam. It seems clear that they view this arrangement as a way to obtain high paying jobs and to earn additional foreign exchange.

Korean Defense Minister Choi raised this matter with Secretary Clifford and Secretary Nitze during his visit here last month.2 In response to his argument that the question of the 6,000 additional combat troops could be dealt with separately and later, he was told that this decision could only be made by the President.

It is recommended that we not now agree to the dispatch of these additional ROK civilians and that this be delayed until such time as the ROK Government is prepared to send additional combat troops. This recommendation is supported by the following reasons:

1. These 5,000 civilians have always been part of the package for an additional ROK light division of 11,000 men. If the package is now divided and the civilians separately approved, the chances, already slim, of later obtaining the additional 6,000 combat troops, are probably much diminished.

2. Because the ROKs view this as a monetary transaction, they have asked for comparatively high pay scales for these civilians. At their "asking" price, the total wages for 5,000 additional ROK civilians would cost the U.S. about $22 million annually. Ambassador Porter thinks it would take at least $15 to $18 million annually to satisfy ROK political and economic requirements. However, Ambassador Bunker and Admiral Sharp recommend we pay no more than $4 to $5 million annually. Wages for a comparable number of ROK military personnel in Vietnam, including overseas allowances paid by the U.S. and base pay and allowances paid by the ROK Government, would be about $5 million annually. Wages paid in Korea for a comparable number of ROK civilians in equivalent jobs would be about $4 million annually. The Korean asking price for the lowest grade civilian would be about $4,000 per year, compared with about $800 per year earned by a ROK soldier in Vietnam for an equivalent job and about $600 per year earned by a ROK civilian in Korea in a comparable position.

We continue to receive congressional and public criticism of U.S. payments to Korean troops and civilians currently in Vietnam. We are criticized for hiring "mercenaries" and for giving Korean civilians preferential consideration over U.S. and other TCN personnel. If we now accede to either the Korean asking price or Ambassador Porter's recommendation, the resultant bonus paid to these additional Korean

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