Re..ÇÑ¹Ì »ó¿øÀ§¿øȸ Á¶»ç¼¿¡´Â Çѱ¹±ºÀÇ ÀÏ´çÀÌ ÇÏ·ç¿¡1$ ´Ù
ÀϺ» °æÁ¦ÀûÀ¸·Î´Â ¹Ù¶÷Á÷ÇÏÁö¸¸ Á¤Ä¡ÀûÀ¸·Î ÀαⰡ ¾ø´Ù; (Çص¶µÇÁö ¾ÊÀº Ãâó ÅؽºÆ®ÀÇ 1ÁÙ ¹Ì¸¸), Áý±Ç´çÀÎ ¹ÎÁÖ °øÈ´çÀÇ ÆĹúÁÖÀÇ; ±×¸®°í ƯÈ÷ Çлý°ú Áö½ÄÀÎµé »çÀÌ¿¡ ÀÖ´Â ´Ù¾çÇÑ ¸¸¼ºÀûÀÎ ´ëÁßÀÇ ºÒ¸¸µé°ú ÇÔ²². Serious trouble could arise over any of these issues, and while the military is likely to support the regime in most circumstances, its support cannot be guaranteed in all cases. (Paras. ÀÌ·± ¹®Á¦µé Áß ¾î´À °Í¿¡µµ ½É°¢ÇÑ ¹®Á¦°¡ ¹ß»ýÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÀ¸¸ç, ±ºÀÌ ´ëºÎºÐÀÇ »óȲ¿¡¼ Á¤±ÇÀ» Áö¿øÇÒ °¡´É¼ºÀÌ ³ôÀº ¹Ý¸é, ¸ðµç °æ¿ì¿¡ ±× Áö¿øÀ» º¸ÀåÇÒ ¼ö´Â ¾ø´Ù.(ÆĶó½Ã¾Æ) 6–14) 6–14)
D. Lasting stability is not likely unless further progress is made in improving a weak and imbalanced economy, heavily dependent on large-scale US assistance and burdened with serious problems of unemployment and a population growing at nearly three percent per year.D. ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ´ë±Ô¸ð Áö¿ø¿¡ Å©°Ô ÀÇÁ¸ÇÏ°í ÀÖÀ¸¸ç ½É°¢ÇÑ ½Ç¾÷ ¹®Á¦¿Í ¿¬°£ 3%¿¡ °¡±î¿î Àα¸ Áõ°¡¿¡ ºÎ´ãÀ» ´À³¢°í ÀÖ´Â ¾àÇÏ°í ºÒ±ÕÇüÇÑ °æÁ¦¸¦ °³¼±Çϴµ¥ ÀÖ¾î ´õ ÀÌ»óÀÇ ÁøÀüÀÌ ÀÌ·ç¾îÁöÁö ¾Ê´Â ÇÑ Áö¼ÓÀûÀÎ ¾ÈÁ¤Àº °¡´ÉÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Ù.
Grounds for optimism are very limited, though a settlement with Japan-for which chances are about even during the next year—would help.
³«°ü·ÐÀÇ ±Ù°Å´Â ¸Å¿ì Á¦ÇÑÀûÀÌÁö¸¸ ½ÉÁö¾î ³»³â¿¡µµ ±âȸ°¡ ÀÖ´Â ÀϺ»°úÀÇ ÇÕÀÇ´Â µµ¿òÀÌ µÉ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. In the best circumstances, however, the ROK will remain a petitioner for large and continuing US assistance for years to come. (Paras. 15–28)
±×·¯³ª ÃÖ»óÀÇ »óȲ¿¡¼ Çѱ¹Àº ÇâÈÄ ¼ö³â°£ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ´ë±Ô¸ð Áö¼ÓÀûÀÎ Áö¿ø¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Ã»¿øÀÚ·Î ³²À» °ÍÀÌ´Ù. (±âÁ¸ 15–28)
E. We believe that, during the next few years, the unification issue is likely to represent a more insistent problem for the ROK leaders than in the past.E.
¿ì¸®´Â ÇâÈÄ ¸î ³â µ¿¾È ÅëÀÏ ¹®Á¦°¡ °ú°Åº¸´Ù Çѱ¹ ÁöµµÀڵ鿡°Ô ´õ ²öÁú±ä ¹®Á¦¸¦ ³ªÅ¸³¾ °¡´É¼ºÀÌ ³ô´Ù°í ¹Ï´Â´Ù.
The North will probably continue to keep the initiative on unification, and sentiment within the ROK will make it more difficult for Seoul to stand pat.
ºÏÇÑÀº ¾Æ¸¶µµ ÅëÀÏ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÁÖµµ±ÇÀ» °è¼Ó À¯ÁöÇÒ °ÍÀÌ°í, ³²ÇÑ ³»ºÎÀÇ Á¤¼´Â ³²ÇÑ Á¤ºÎ°¡ ¹öƼ´Â °ÍÀ» ´õ ¾î·Æ°Ô ¸¸µé °ÍÀÌ´Ù. Pyongyang may fare better in the UN than in the past, particularly if Communist China is admitted or otherwise significantly improves its international status. ƯÈ÷ °ø»ê Áß±¹ÀÌ ÀÎÁ¤¹Þ°Å³ª ´Ù¸¥ ¹æ¹ýÀ¸·Î ±¹Á¦ ÁöÀ§¸¦ Å©°Ô Çâ»ó½ÃŲ´Ù¸é ºÏÇÑÀº °ú°Åº¸´Ù À¯¿£¿¡¼ ´õ Àß Áö³¾ ¼ö ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
We do not believe, however, that the trend is likely either to bring about the fall of the ROK Government or move it to contemplate unification
±×·¯³ª ÀÌ·± Ãß¼¼°¡ Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎÀÇ ¸ô¶ôÀ» ºÒ·¯¿À°Å³ª ÅëÀÏÀ» °í·ÁÇÏ´Â ÂÊÀ¸·Î ¿Å°Ü°¥ °¡´É¼ºÀº ³·´Ù°í º»´Ù.
dented domestic disasters or becomes convinced that US support is weakening. (Paras. 29–41)
±¹³» Àç³À» ¿òÇ« ÆÐÀ̰ųª ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ Áö¿øÀÌ ¾àÇØÁö°í ÀÖ´Ù°í È®½ÅÇÏ°Ô µÈ´Ù.(±âÁ¸ 29~41)
[[1 paragraph ´Ü¶ô ((5 lines ÁÙµé of ÀÇ source Ãâó text¹®ÀÚ ¸Þ½ÃÁö¸¦ º¸³»´Ù) ) not ¾Æ´Ñ declassified±â¹Ð ÇØÁ¦µÈ] ]
[Here follow the Discussion section of the estimate, (text not declassified) and a map of Korea.)[¿©±â´Â °ßÀû¼ Åä·Ð ¼½¼Ç, (ÇØÁ¦µÇÁö ¾ÊÀº ÅؽºÆ®) ¹× Çѱ¹ Áöµµ¸¦ µû¸£½Ê½Ã¿À.)
On January 26, 1965, the Korean National Assembly approved sending additional military personnel to Vietnam after contentious opposition by members of the Civil Rule Party and the Democratic Party.
1965³â 1¿ù 26ÀÏ, Çѱ¹ ±¹È¸´Â ¹Î¹ý´ç°ú ¹ÎÁÖ´ç ÀÇ¿øµéÀÇ ¹Ý´ë¿¡ ºÎµúÃÄ º£Æ®³²¿¡ Ãß°¡ ±º º´·ÂÀ» ÆÄ°ßÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ» ½ÂÀÎÇß´Ù.
The Civil Rule Party, led by Yun Po-sun, distrusted the Pak regime and feared that the dispatch of more troops would leave South Korea vulnerable to North Korean subversion by weakening its defenses.
À±º¸¼± ÀÇ¿øÀÌ À̲ô´Â ¹Î¹ý´çÀº ¹Ú Àü ´ëÅë·É üÁ¦¸¦ ºÒ½ÅÇÏ°í, Ãß°¡ Æĺ´ÀÌ ¹æ¾î¸¦ ¾àȽÃÄÑ ³²ÇÑÀ» ºÏÇÑÀÇ Àüº¹¿¡ Ãë¾àÇÏ°Ô ¸¸µé °ÍÀ» ¿ì·ÁÇß´Ù.
Both opposition parties also criticized the Minister of Defense for making conflicting statements regarding the impetus behind the proposal, at times claiming that the Korean Government initiated the proposal to send troops to Vietnam, at others referring to a request from the Republic of Vietnam or from the United States.
µÎ ¾ß´ç ¸ðµÎ Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ°¡ º£Æ®³²À̳ª ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¿äûÀ» ¾ð±ÞÇÏ¸ç º£Æ®³² Æĺ´ Á¦¾ÈÀ» ½ÃÀÛÇß´Ù°í ÁÖÀåÇÏ¸é¼ ±¹¹æºÎ Àå°üÀÌ ÀÌ Á¦¾ÈÀÇ ÃßÁø µ¿·Â°ú °ü·ÃÇØ »ó¹ÝµÈ ¹ß¾ðÀ» Çß´Ù°í ºñÆÇÇß´Ù.
A Civil Rule Party member also privately informed the Embassy that because of "cuts in US foreign aid program it is doubtful USG really intends to persevere in Vietnamese war and that it is difficult to understand why ROK should send troops to become involved in situation which appears hopeless." (Telegram 647 from Seoul, January 21; National Arch
¹Î¹ý´çÀÇ ÇÑ ´çÁ÷ÀÚµµ ¹Ì ´ë»ç°ü¿¡ "¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ´ë¿Ü¿øÁ¶ ÇÁ·Î±×·¥À» Ãà¼ÒÇ߱⠶§¹®¿¡ ¹Ì ±¹¹æºÎ°¡ º£Æ®³² ÀüÀï¿¡ ÂüÀüÀ» ÇÏ·Á´Â Àǵµ°¡ Àǽɽº·´´Ù"¸é¼ "Çѱ¹ÀÌ ¿Ö ±º´ë¸¦ º¸³» Èñ¸ÁÀÌ ¾ø¾î º¸ÀÌ´Â »óȲ¿¡ ¿Ö Çѱ¹ÀÌ °³ÀÔÇØ¾ß ÇÏ´ÂÁö ÀÌÇØÇϱ⠾î·Æ´Ù.
"(1¿ù 21ÀÏ ¼¿ï ÅÚ·¹±×·¥ 647; ±¹¸³ ¾ÆÄ¡)ives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 VIET S; and telegrams 656 and 657, both from Seoul, January 22, ibid., DEF 19–2 KOR S VIET S).ives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 VIET S, ±×¸®°í 656 ¹× 657 Àüº¸¸¦ ¼¿ï, ibid, DEF 19–2 KOR S VIET S).
When the proposal came before the Assembly for a vote, its passage was complicated by the Assembly's decision to vote by secret ballot.
±× Á¦¾ÈÀÌ ±¹È¸¿¡ Á¦ÃâµÇ¾úÀ» ¶§, ºñ¹Ð ÅõÇ¥·Î ÅõÇ¥Çϱâ·Î ÇÑ ±¹È¸ÀÇ °áÁ¤À¸·Î Åë°ú°¡ º¹ÀâÇØÁ³´Ù.
That decision prompted Yun Po-sun and 23 other members of the Civil Rule Party to walk out in protest.
±× °áÁ¤Àº À±Æ÷¼±°ú ¹Î¹ý´çÀÇ 23¸íÀÇ ´Ù¸¥ ´ç¿øµé¿¡°Ô Ç×ÀÇÀÇ Ç¥½Ã·Î ÅðÀåÇÏ°Ô Çß´Ù.
The dispatch of troops was approved by an overwhelming majority of the remaining members, all representing the ruling Democratic Republican Party. (Telegram 670 from Seoul, January 26; ibid.)
Æĺ´Àº Áý±Ç ¿©´çÀÎ ¹ÎÁÖ°øÈ´çÀ» ´ëÇ¥ÇÏ´Â ³ª¸ÓÁö ÀÇ¿øµé Áß ¾ÐµµÀû ´Ù¼ö°¡ Âù¼ºÇß´Ù.
(¼¿ï¿¡¼ 1¿ù 26ÀÏ, ibid) Afterward President Pak issued a statement praising the results of the vote and characterizing it "as a signal for Korea to 'to assume important role in world affairs. ÀÌÈÄ ¹Ú ´ëÅë·ÉÀº "Çѱ¹ÀÌ ¼¼°è Á¤¼¼¿¡ Áß¿äÇÑ ¿ªÇÒÀ» ¸ÃÀ¸¶ó´Â ½ÅÈ£·Î ÅõÇ¥ °á°ú¸¦ Âù¾çÇÏ°í À̸¦ Ư¡Áþ´Â´Ù"°í ¼º¸íÀ» ¹ßÇ¥Çß´Ù."
" The opposition Civil Rule Party and Democratic Party accepted the outcome and hoped that the Korean troops would contribute to uniting the nations of the free world and to bringing peace and stability to the region. (Telegram 678 from Seoul, January 27; ibid.)
" ¾ß´çÀÎ ¹Î¹ý´ç°ú ¹ÎÁÖ´çÀº ±× °á°ú¸¦ ¹Þ¾Æµé¿´°í Çѱ¹±ºÀÌ ÀÚÀ¯¼¼°èÀÇ ±¹°¡µéÀ» ÅëÇÕÇÏ°í ±× Áö¿ª¿¡ ÆòÈ¿Í ¾ÈÁ¤À» °¡Á®¿À´Â µ¥ ±â¿©Çϱ⸦ Èñ¸ÁÇß´Ù. (1¿ù 27ÀÏ ¼¿ï¿¡¼ ¿Â 678 ÅÚ·¹ºñÀü ¹æ¼Û, ibid)
After the National Assembly approved the dispatch of additional troops, the Korean and United States Governments concentrated on the issue of the rate and method to be used to pay allowances to the Korean military personnel serving in Vietnam.
ÇÑ¹Ì Á¤ºÎ´Â ±¹È¸°¡ Ãß°¡ Æĺ´À» ½ÂÀÎÇÑ µÚ º£Æ®³² ÁÖÀç Çѱ¹±º À庴µé¿¡°Ô ¼ö´çÀ» Áö±ÞÇÏ´Â µ¥ »ç¿ëÇÒ ºñÀ²°ú ¹æ¹ý ¹®Á¦¿¡ ÁýÁßÇß´Ù.
In late February the United States acceded to a Korean demand for payment to be made to the Korean Government with an unvouchered cash grant to be disbursed in dollars to Korean troops.
2¿ù ¸»¿¡ ¹Ì±¹Àº Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ¿¡ ÁöºÒÇ϶ó´Â Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎÀÇ ¿ä±¸¿¡ ÀÀÇß°í, Çѱ¹ ±º´ë¿¡ ´Þ·¯·Î ÁöºÒÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø´Â Çö±Ý º¸Á¶±ÝÀ» Áö±ÞÇ϶ó´Â ¿ä±¸¸¦ ¹Þ¾Ò´Ù.
Although the United States urged that payment be limited to an allowance of one dollar per day per man, the Koreans rejected that amount as conflicting with previous promises made to the troops and as inappropriate for higher-ranking men and officers. (Telegram 768 to Seoul, February 18; ibid., DEF 19 US-KOR S) Korean officials agreed with the Uni
¹Ì±¹Àº 1Àδç ÇÏ·ç 1´Þ·¯ÀÇ ¼ö´çÀ¸·Î Áö±ÞÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù°í ÁÖÀåÇßÁö¸¸, Çѱ¹ÃøÀº ¹Ì±º¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÌÀü ¾à¼Ó°ú »óÃæµÇ°í °íÀ§ °ü¸®µé¿¡°Ô ºÎÀûÀýÇÑ ±Ý¾×À̶ó°í ÀÏÃàÇß´Ù.
(2¿ù 18ÀÏ, ibid, DEF 19 US-KOR S) Çѱ¹ °ü¸®µéÀº À¯´Ï¿Í ÇÕÀÇÇÏ¿´´Ù.ted States request to do everything possible to prevent disclosing that funding originated in the United States.Å×µå ÁÖµéÀº ¹Ì±¹¿¡¼ ½ÃÀÛµÈ ÀÚ±Ý Áö¿øÀÌ °ø°³µÇ´Â °ÍÀ» ¸·±â À§ÇØ °¡´ÉÇÑ ¸ðµç °ÍÀ» ÇÒ °ÍÀ» ¿äûÇÑ´Ù.
The United States also agreed to assume all costs for the medical and tae-kwon-do units already in Vietnam.
¹Ì±¹Àº ¶ÇÇÑ º£Æ®³²¿¡ ÀÌ¹Ì ÁÖµÐÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Â ÀÇ·á ¹× Å±ǵµ ºÎ´ëÀÇ ¸ðµç ºñ¿ëÀ» ºÎ´ãÇϱâ·Î ÇÕÀÇÇß´Ù. (
Telegram 799 to Seoul, February 27; ibid., POL 27–3 VIETS) Additional documentation on the development of this issue is ibid. (Telegram 799 to Seoul, 2¿ù 27ÀÏ; ibid, POL 27–3 VIETS) ÀÌ À̽´ÀÇ °³¹ß¿¡ °üÇÑ Ãß°¡ ¹®¼´Â ibidÀÌ´Ù.; DEF 19 KOR S-US; DEF 19 US-KOR S; and DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S.; DEF 19 KOR S-US, DEF 19 US-KOR S, DEF 19 KOR S-VET S.
The first of these troops, an advance party of approximately 600 men, arrived in Saigon on February
25.À̵é Áß Ã¹ ¹ø° º´·ÂÀÎ ¾à 600¸íÀÇ ¼±¹ß´ë´Â 2¿ù 25ÀÏ »çÀÌ°ø¿¡ µµÂøÇß´Ù.
The remaining 1,400 troops were to arrive within the next month. (Telegram 2775 from Saigon, February 26; ibid., AID (KOR S) VIET S) ³ª¸ÓÁö 1400¸íÀÇ º´·ÂÀº ´ÙÀ½ ´Þ ¾È¿¡ µµÂøÇÒ ¿¹Á¤À̾ú´Ù.(2¿ù 26ÀÏ »çÀÌ°ø¿¡¼ 2775¹ø ÅÚ·¹±×·¥; ibid, AID(KOR S) VIPT S)
Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of ÁÖÇÑ ´ë»ç°üÀ¸·ÎºÎÅÍ ÀÇ ºÎ¼·Î Àüº¸ State ÁÖ
Seoul, March 15, 1965, 5 p.m.1965³â 3¿ù 15ÀÏ ¿ÀÈÄ 5½Ã ¼¿ï.
866. Country Team Message.866. ÄÁÆ®¸® ÆÀ ¸Þ½ÃÁö.
1. CT has considered various implications of cuts in US forces Korea which we understand are impending, for implementation between now and June 30,
1965.1. CT´Â ÇöÀç¿Í 1965³â 6¿ù 30ÀÏ »çÀÌ¿¡ ½ÃÇàµÉ ÁÖÇѹ̱º °¨ÃàÀÇ ´Ù¾çÇÑ ½Ã»çÁ¡À» °í·ÁÇß´Ù.
Our information stems from DA instructions received by COMUS Korea which indicate decision has been taken to subtract 9,000 spaces from present authorized strength of 8th US Army amounting to
51,000. ¿ì¸®ÀÇ Á¤º¸´Â COMUS ÄÚ¸®¾Æ°¡ ¹ÞÀº DA Áöħ¿¡¼ ³ª¿Â °ÍÀ¸·Î ÇöÀç ¹Ì 8±º 5¸¸1õ¸í ±Ô¸ð¿¡¼ 9õ¸íÀ» °¨ÃàÇϱâ·Î °áÁ¤Çß´Ù´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
The decision is reportedly based on balance-of-payments considerations.? º¸µµ¿¡ µû¸£¸é, ÀÌ °áÁ¤Àº ¼öÁö ±ÕÇü °í·Á¿¡ ±Ù°ÅÇÑ °ÍÀ̶ó°í ÇÑ´Ù.
2. Cut of this magnitude represents reduction of about 18 percent in level of US Army Forces in Korea.2. ÀÌ Á¤µµ ±Ô¸ðÀÇ °¨ÃàÀº ÁÖÇѹ̱ºÀÇ ¾à 18%ÀÇ °¨ÃàÀ» ÀǹÌÇÑ´Ù.
This reduction in numbers of personnel would be likely sooner or later to attract public attention and give rise to rumors that US forces are "pulling out of Korea.
ÀÌ·± Àοø °¨ÃàÀº Á¶¸¸°£ ´ëÁßÀÇ °ü½ÉÀ» ²ø°í ¹Ì±ºÀÌ "Çѱ¹¿¡¼ ö¼öÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù"´Â ¼Ò¹®À» ºÒ·¯ÀÏÀ¸Å³ °¡´É¼ºÀÌ ³ô´Ù.
By the same token it would be virtually impossible to conceal fact and extent of reductions from ROKG. °°Àº ¡ǥ·Î, ROKG·ÎºÎÅÍ »ç½Ç°ú °¨¼Ò Á¤µµ¸¦ ¼û±â´Â °ÍÀº »ç½Ç»ó ºÒ°¡´ÉÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
If we attempt to do this we are almost
¸¸¾à ¿ì¸®°¡ ÀÌ°ÍÀ» ÇÏ·Á°í ÇÑ´Ù¸é ¿ì¸®´Â °ÅÀÇ ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
other hand, we inform ROKG at outset, result likely to be immediate leaks to press and National Assembly setting off widespread alarm that
´Ù¸¥ ÇÑÆíÀ¸·Î, ¿ì¸®´Â Ãʱ⿡´Â ROKG¿¡ Å뺸ÇÑ´Ù. ±× °á°ú´Â Áï°¢ÀûÀÎ ¾ð·Ð À¯ÃâÀÏ °¡´É¼ºÀÌ ³ô°í, ±¹È¸´Â ÀÌ »ç½ÇÀ» ³Î¸® ¾Ë·È´Ù.
settlement.°á»ê It goes without saying that such a furor at this time would jeopardize prospect for successful conclusion that settlement which we have been expecting after so long this spring.
ÀÌ ½Ã±â¿¡ ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ È¥¶õÀº ¿ì¸®°¡ À̹ø º½¿¡ ±×Åä·Ï ¿À·§µ¿¾È ±â´Ù·Á¿Â ÇØ°áÀÇ ¼º°øÀûÀÎ °á·Ð¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Àü¸ÁÀ» À§ÅÂ·Ó°Ô ÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó´Â °ÍÀº µÎ¸»ÇÒ ³ª ¶ÇÇÑ ¾ø´Ù. As Dept aware, one of µªÀÌ ¾Ë±â·Î´Â
chief fruits ROKG seeking from forthcoming Washington visit President Pak is assurance that present US force levels will be maintained (Embtel 861).' President and Foreign Minister have indicated that ROKG relying heavily on this and related assurances of continuing US commitment to Korea to help win public support for Korea-Japan settlement.
¹Ú ´ëÅë·ÉÀ» ¿¹¹æÇϱâ À§ÇÑ ÁÖ¿ä ¼º°ú¹°ÀÎ ROKG´Â ÇöÀçÀÇ ÁÖÇѹ̱º ¼öÁØÀÌ À¯ÁöµÉ °ÍÀ̶ó°í È®½ÅÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù.
3. As indicated in previous para, failure on our part to give prior notification to ROKG of impending cut would give rise to accusation we not complying faithfully with our stated intention to consult with ROKG on this question.
(3) ÀÌÀü Ç׿¡¼ Ç¥½ÃÇÑ ¹Ù¿Í °°ÀÌ, ´ç»ç Ãø¿¡¼ ROKG¿¡°Ô ÄÆÀÌ ÀÓ¹ÚÇß´Ù´Â »çÀü ÅëÁö¸¦ ÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀ» °æ¿ì, º» ¹®Á¦¿¡ ´ëÇØ ROKG¿Í ÇùÀÇÇÏ°íÀÚ ÇÏ´Â ¿ì¸®ÀÇ ¸í½ÃÀû Àǵµ¸¦ Ãæ½ÇÈ÷ ÁؼöÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù´Â ºñ³À» ÃÊ·¡ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù.
Most explicit assurance on this point was given personally by Secretary Rusk to President Pak at their meeting in January 1964 when Secretary said force reduction was not a current problem and US approach would be to examine question later on in consultation with Korean Govt (93540, para 32, Jan 31, 1964).
·¯½ºÅ© Àå°üÀº 1964³â 1¿ù ¹Ú ´ëÅë·É°úÀÇ È¸´ã¿¡¼ "¹«·Â°¨ÃàÀº ÇöÀçÀÇ ¹®Á¦°¡ ¾Æ´Ï¸ç ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ Á¢±Ù¹æ½ÄÀº ³ªÁß¿¡ Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ(93540, 1964³â 1¿ù 31ÀÏ)¿Í ÇùÀÇÇØ ¹®Á¦¸¦ °ËÅäÇÒ °Í"À̶ó°í ¹àÈù ¹Ù ÀÖ´Ù.
Whether or not our recommendation given below that cut be postponed is accepted we believe that we must honor this commitment, at least by going through motions of consultation. ¾Æ·¡¿¡ Á¦½ÃµÈ ¿ì¸®ÀÇ ±Ç°í¾ÈÀÌ ¹Þ¾Æµé¿©Áöµç ¾Æ´Ïµç °£¿¡ ¿ì¸®´Â Àû¾îµµ ÇùÀÇÀÇ ¿òÁ÷ÀÓÀ» ÅëÇØ ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¾à¼ÓÀ» ÁöÄÑ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù°í ¹Ï´Â´Ù.
4. However, now is not a good time to hold such consultations.
4. ±×·¯³ª Áö±ÝÀº ±×·± »ó´ãÀ» Çϱ⿡ ÁÁÀº ½Ã±â°¡ ¾Æ´Ï´Ù.
It would spoil the atmosphere which both we and the ROKG hope to generate for President Pak's forthcoming visit to Washington and for the successful conclusion Korean-Japan talks.
±×°ÍÀº ¹Ú ´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ °ð ÀÖÀ» ¿ö½ÌÅÏ ¹æ¹®°ú ¼º°øÀûÀÎ ÇÑÀÏ È¸´ãÀÇ ¸¶¹«¸®¸¦ À§ÇØ ¿ì¸®³ª Çѱ¹³ëµ¿À§¿øȸ ¸ðµÎ°¡ ¸¸µé°íÀÚ ÇÏ´Â ºÐÀ§±â¸¦ ¸ÁÄ¥ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
A settlement with Japan is almost within grasp; the outcome will be known, probably with certainty, before June
30. ÀϺ»°úÀÇ ÇÕÀÇ´Â °ÅÀÇ ¼Õ¿¡ ÀâÈú °ÍÀÌ´Ù; ±× °á°ú´Â ¾Æ¸¶µµ 6¿ù 30ÀÏ ÀÌÀü¿¡ È®½ÇÈ÷ ¾Ë·ÁÁú °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
We believe that this accomplishment which for years has been a paramount objective of US policy in East Asia is so vitally related to the US national interest that the balance of payments savings which would accrue from the contemplated reduction over the next few months can and should be foregone until the outcome of the current negotiations is d
¿ì¸®´Â ¼ö³â µ¿¾È µ¿¾Æ½Ã¾Æ¿¡¼ ¹Ì±¹ Á¤Ã¥ÀÇ °¡Àå Áß¿äÇÑ ¸ñÇ¥¿´´ø ÀÌ ¼º°ú´Â ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ±¹ÀÍ°ú ¸Å¿ì ¹ÐÁ¢ÇÑ °ü·ÃÀÌ Àֱ⠶§¹®¿¡ ÇâÈÄ ¸î ´Þ µ¿¾È ½É»ç¼÷°íµÈ °¨ÃàÀ¸·Î ÀÎÇØ ¹ß»ýÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÁöºÒ¼öÁö°¡ ÇöÀçÀÇ Çù»óÀÇ °á°ú°¡ ³ª¿Ã ¶§±îÁö ¿¹ÃøµÉ ¼ö ÀÖ°í ¶Ç ¿¹ÃøµÇ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù°í ¹Ï´Â´Ù.ecided one way or the other.ÀÌ·¨´Ù Àú·¨´ÙÇÏ´Ù
5. Our rough estimate is that the reduction contemplated might reduce total US military spending in Korea by somewhere between $5 million and $10 million annually depending on how the reductions are carried out.
5. ¿ì¸®ÀÇ ´ë·«ÀûÀÎ ÃßÁ¤Àº °¨ÃàÀÌ ¾î¶»°Ô ÀÌ·ç¾îÁö´À³Ä¿¡ µû¶ó ÁÖÇѹ̱º ÃÑÁöÃâÀÌ ¿¬°£ 500¸¸ ´Þ·¯¿¡¼ 1000¸¸ ´Þ·¯ Á¤µµ °¨¼ÒÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
CT does not deprecate the contribution this reduction in spending would make to a solution of our balance of payments problem, although doubting that it will be entirely a net gain to US in view US position as residual supporter of ROK balance of payments.
CT´Â ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ÁöÃâ Ãà¼Ò°¡ ¿ì¸®ÀÇ ¼öÁö ¹®Á¦¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÇØ°áÃ¥ÀÇ ±â¿©¸¦ ºñ³ÇÏÁö´Â ¾ÊÁö¸¸, ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¼öÁö Ÿ»êÀÇ ÀÜ¿© ÁöÁöÀڷμ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ÀÔÀåÀ» º¼ ¶§ ±×°ÍÀÌ ÀüÀûÀ¸·Î ¼øÀÌÀÍÀÌ µÉ °ÍÀ̶ó°í ÀǽÉÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù. Meeting ¸¸³²
3 In telegram 861 from Seoul, March 12, the Embassy outlined the subjects Pak wanted to discuss during his Washington visit.
3¿ù 12ÀÏ ¼¿ï¹ß 861Àüº¸¿¡¼ ´ë»ç°üÀº ¹Ú ´ëÅë·ÉÀÌ ¿ö½ÌÅÏ ¹æ¹® Áß ³íÀÇÇÏ°íÀÚ Çß´ø ÁÖÁ¦µé¿¡ ´ëÇØ °£·«È÷ ¼³¸íÇß´Ù.
With regard to Korea's security, Pak wanted to maintain U.S. and Korean force levels, increase MAP funds, and modernize Korean military equipment. (Ibid., POL 7 KOR S) The Minister of National Defense had also raised the issue of maintaining U.S. force levels in Korea during the negotiations in January on sending Korean forces to Vietnam.
Çѱ¹ ¾Èº¸¿Í °ü·ÃÇØ ¹Ú Àå°üÀº Áö³ 1¿ù º£Æ®³² Æĺ´ Çù»ó ¶§µµ ÁÖÇѹ̱º ¼öÁØ À¯Áö ¹®Á¦¸¦ Á¦±âÇß¾ú´Ù. (Telegram 621 to Seoul, January 18, and telegram 658 from Seoul, January 22; ibid., DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S)
(1¿ù 18ÀÏ ¼¿ï·Î 621¹ø ÅÚ·¹±×·¥°ú 1¿ù 22ÀÏ ¼¿ï¿¡¼ 658¹ø Àüº¸; ibid, DEF 19 KOR S-VENT S)
Not found, but telegram UK 60079 from CINCUNC, January 31, 1964, contains Rusk's comments to Pak on the question of force reduction. (Ibid., POL 27 KOR S) The joint communiqué released at the conclusion of Rusk's visit also addressed the issue; see footnote 4, document
3.ãÀ» ¼ö ¾øÁö¸¸ 1964³â 1¿ù 31ÀÏ, CNCUNC¿¡¼ ¿µ±¹ 60079¹ø Àüº¸¿¡´Â ¹Ú Àü ´ëÅë·É¿¡°Ô º¸³½ ¹«·Â°¨Ãà ¹®Á¦¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ·¯½ºÅ©ÀÇ ¾ð±ÞÀÌ ´ã°Ü ÀÖ´Ù.(Ibid, POL 27 KORS) ·¯½ºÅ© ¹æ¹® Á¾·á ½Ã °ø°³µÈ °øµ¿°ø¹®µµ ÀÌ ¹®Á¦¸¦ ´Ù·ç¾ú´Ù; °¢ÁÖ 4, ¹®¼ 3 ÂüÁ¶.
high priority US objectives for Korean economic development may require additional offsetting supporting assistance.Çѱ¹ °æÁ¦ ¹ßÀüÀ» À§ÇÑ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ³ôÀº ¿ì¼±¼øÀ§ ¸ñÇ¥´Â Ãß°¡ÀûÀÎ »ó¼â Áö¿ø Áö¿øÀÌ ÇÊ¿äÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù.
6. Ideally, as set forth in agreed language of draft national policy paper on Korea, now in process final revision Washington, we believe no reductions in either ROK or US forces should be considered until after Korea-Japan normalization.
6. ÀÌ»óÀûÀ¸·Î, ÇöÀç ÃÖÁ¾ °³Á¤ Áß¿¡ ÀÖ´Â Çѱ¹¿¡ °üÇÑ ±¹°¡ Á¤Ã¥ º¸°í¼ ÃʾÈÀÇ ÇÕÀÇµÈ ¾ð¾î·Î Á¦½ÃµÈ ¹Ù¿Í °°ÀÌ, ¿ì¸®´Â ÇÑ-ÀÏ Á¤»óÈ°¡ ³¡³¯ ¶§±îÁö Çѱ¹±º°ú ¹Ì±ºÀÇ °¨ÃàÀ» °í·ÁÇؼ´Â ¾È µÈ´Ù°í »ý°¢ÇÑ´Ù.
In accordance with that carefully thought out recommendation we strongly urge that any reduction in US Forces Korea be postponed until a suitable period after a settlement with Japan is reached this year.
½ÅÁßÈ÷ »ý°¢ÇØ º» ±Ç°í¾È¿¡ µû¶ó ¿ì¸®´Â ÁÖÇѹ̱º °¨ÃàÀ» ¿ÃÇØ ÀϺ»°úÀÇ ÇÕÀÇ°¡ ÀÌ·ç¾îÁø ÈÄ ÀûÀýÇÑ ±â°£À¸·Î ¿¬±âÇÒ °ÍÀ» °·ÂÈ÷ Ã˱¸ÇÑ´Ù.
If a settlement is reached, say by June 1, our judgment is that a period of at least six months should be allowed for the dust of that action, and its ratification by the National Assembly, to settle.
¸¸¾à 6¿ù 1ÀϱîÁö ÇÕÀÇ°¡ ÀÌ·ç¾îÁø´Ù¸é, ¿ì¸®ÀÇ ÆÇ´ÜÀº ÃÖ¼ÒÇÑ 6°³¿ùÀÇ ±â°£ÀÌ ±× ÇൿÀÇ ¸ÕÁö¿Í ±¹È¸ ºñÁØÀ» À§ÇØ Çã¿ëµÇ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
Consultations with the ROKG on reduction of US Forces could then begin toward the end of the year. ÁÖÇѹ̱º °¨Ãà¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ROKG¿ÍÀÇ ÇùÀÇ´Â ¿¬¸»¿¡ ½ÃÀÛµÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù.
sense of foregoing subject to qualification that as CG 8th Army he is not appealing decision to carry out strength cut.CG
8±º´ÜÀ¸·Î¼ Àü·Â °¨ÃàÀ» ¼öÇàÇϴµ¥ ÀÖ¾î È£¼Ò·Â ÀÖ´Â °áÁ¤À» ÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù´Â ÀÚ°Ý ¿ä°Ç¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿¹°¨.
DohertyµµÇãƼ
5 The National Policy Paper on the Republic of Korea, consisting of Part 1, ¡°U.S. Policy," November 9, 1965, and Part 2, ¡°Factors Bearing on U.S. Policy," August 1965, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, Country Files.5 The National Policy Paper on the Republic of Korea, consisting of Part 1, ¡°U.S. Policy," November 9, 1965, and Part 2, ¡°Factors Bearing on U.S. Policy," August 1965, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, Country Files.
Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won visited Washington March 15–17,
1965.1965³â 3¿ù 15~17ÀÏ, ¿Ü¹«ºÎ Àå°ü À̵¿¿ø¾¾°¡ ¿ö½ÌÅÏÀ» ¹æ¹®Çß´Ù.
He met with Secretary Rusk on March 15 to discuss current Korean problems, including the situation in Vietnam, the Korea-Japan settlement, North Korea, the pending Status of Forces Agreement, economic matters, and similar issues. ±×
´Â Áö³´Þ 15ÀÏ ·¯½ºÅ© Àå°üÀ» ¸¸³ª º£Æ®³² Á¤¼¼, ÇÑÀÏÇùÁ¤, ºÏÇÑ ¹®Á¦, ÁÖÇѹ̱ºÁöÀ§ÇùÁ¤, °æÁ¦¹®Á¦, À¯»ç ¹®Á¦ µî ÇöÀç Çѱ¹ ¹®Á¦µé¿¡ ´ëÇØ ³íÀÇÇß´Ù.
On March 16 the Foreign Minister met separately with Vice President Humphrey, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Bundy, and Secretary of Defense McNamara, with whom many of the same issues were discussed, particularly Vietnam and the settlement with Japan. 3¿ù 16ÀÏ ¿Ü¹«Àå°üÀº ÇèÇÁ¸® ºÎÅë·É, ¹øµð ±¹¹«ºÎ Â÷°üº¸, ¸Æ³ª¸¶¶ó ±¹¹æÀå°ü°ú º°µµ·Î ȸ´ãÀ» °¡Á³´Âµ¥, ÀÌ È¸´ã¿¡¼´Â ƯÈ÷ º£Æ®³²°ú ÀϺ»°úÀÇ ÇÕÀÇ µî ¿©·¯ °¡Áö ¹®Á¦°¡ ³íÀǵǾú´Ù.
Before leaving Washington, the Foreign Minister also met briefly with President Johnson to exchange greetings and accept the President's thanks for Korea's support in Vietnam and his congratulations on the progress made thus far toward reaching an agreement with Japan.
¿ö½ÌÅÏÀ» ¶°³ª±â Àü, ¿Ü¹«Àå°üµµ Á¸½¼ ´ëÅë·ÉÀ» Àá±ñ ¸¸³ª Àλ縦 ³ª´©°í, º£Æ®³²¿¡¼ÀÇ Çѱ¹ÀÇ Áö¿ø¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ °¨»ç¿Í ÀϺ»°úÀÇ ÇÕÀǸ¦ ÇâÇÑ Áö±Ý±îÁöÀÇ ÁøÀü¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ±×ÀÇ ÃàÇϸ¦ ¹Þ¾Æµé¿´´Ù.
documentation covering the Foreign Minister's visit is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files¿Ü±³ºÎ Àå°üÀÇ ¹æ¹®¿¡ °üÇÑ ¹®¼´Â ±¹°¡±â·Ï¿ø, RG 59, Áß¾Ó ÆÄÀÏ¿¡ ÀÖ´Ù.
ÇѹÌÁ¶»ç¼ ´ë·Î¶ó¸éÀº ¿ì¸®´Â Á¤ºÎ·ÎºÎÅÍ ´Ü ÇÑǬµµ ¸ø¹Þ°í ¹ÞÀ»°Íµµ ¾ø´Ù
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