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ÆäÀÌÁö ÅؽºÆ® ÆäÀÌÁö. THE BACKGROUND, 1961-1966 7 financing those costs or a portion thereof necessary to prevent the aid from being withdrawn.¹é±×·éµå, 1961-1966 7Àº ¿øÁ¶°¡ öȸµÇ´Â °ÍÀ» ¸·±â À§ÇØ ÇÊ¿äÇÑ ºñ¿ë ¶Ç´Â ±× ÀϺθ¦ Á¶´ÞÇÑ´Ù. Washington would decide the question of cost sharing, and pressed for standardized overseas allowance and maintenance costs, reflecting equal rates for all Free World forces. ¹Ì±¹Àº ºñ¿ë ºÐ´ã ¹®Á¦¸¦ °áÁ¤ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ°í, ¸ðµç ÀÚÀ¯ ¼¼°è ±º´ëÀÇ µ¿ÀÏÇÑ ºñÀ²À» ¹Ý¿µÇÏ¿© Ç¥ÁØÈµÈ ÇØ¿Ü ¼ö´ç ¹× À¯Áö ºñ¿ëÀ» ¿ä±¸ÇÏ¿´´Ù. In the event donors could not meet operating expenses, the Agency for International Development through allocations to the budget would subsidize them. ±âºÎÀÚ°¡ ¿î¿µºñ¸¦ ä¿ï ¼ö ¾øÀ» °æ¿ì ±¹Á¦°³¹ß¿øÀÌ ¿¹»ê ¹èÁ¤À» ÅëÇØ º¸Á¶±ÝÀ» Áö±ÞÇÑ´Ù. Donors were also asked to furnish the supplies and equipment their projects en- tailed. ±âºÎÀÚµéÀº ¶ÇÇÑ ±×µéÀÇ ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ®¿¡ ÇÊ¿äÇÑ ¹°Ç°°ú Àåºñ¸¦ Á¦°øÇϵµ·Ï ¿äû¹Þ¾Ò´Ù. In determining the nature of the project, countries were to keep in mind certain criteria, namely that the project be clear- ly defined, be self-contained, and make a direct contribution to pacification or other priority programs. ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ®ÀÇ ¼º°ÝÀ» °áÁ¤ÇÒ ¶§, ±¹°¡µéÀº ƯÁ¤ ±âÁØ, Áï ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ®°¡ ¸íÈ®ÇÏ°Ô Á¤Àǵǰí, ÀÚ±ÞÀÚÁ·Çϸç, ÆòÈÈ ¶Ç´Â ´Ù¸¥ ¿ì¼±¼øÀ§ ÇÁ·Î±×·¥¿¡ Á÷Á¢ÀûÀÎ ±â¿©¸¦ ÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ¸í½ÉÇØ¾ß Çß´Ù. Because of the accelerating pace of events and continuing political uncertainty in South Vietnam, the U.S. government began to consider contingencies other than using noncomba- tants from the allies. ³²º£Æ®³²¿¡¼ÀÇ »ç°Ç ¹ß»ý ¼Óµµ°¡ »¡¶óÁö°í Á¤Ä¡Àû ºÒÈ®½Ç¼ºÀÌ Áö¼ÓµÇ°í Àֱ⠶§¹®¿¡, ¹Ì±¹ Á¤ºÎ´Â µ¿¸Í±¹µéÀÇ ºñÄĹÙ(noncomba-tants)¸¦ »ç¿ëÇÏ´Â °Í ¿Ü¿¡ ¿ì¹ßÀûÀÎ »óȲÀ» °í·ÁÇϱ⠽ÃÀÛÇß´Ù. In a memorandum of 7 February 1965 to the President, McGeorge Bundy, believing the government of Vietnam would collapse by 1966 without more U.S. help and ac- tion, recommended increasing military pressure against the north. 1965³â 2¿ù 7ÀÏ ´ëÅë·É¿¡°Ô º¸³½ ºñ¸Á·Ï¿¡¼ ¸ÆÁ¶Áö ¹øµð´Â º£Æ®³² Á¤ºÎ°¡ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ´õ ¸¹Àº µµ¿ò°ú Çù·ÂÀÌ ¾øÀ¸¸é 1966³â±îÁö ºØ±«µÉ °ÍÀ̶ó°í ¹ÏÀ¸¸ç ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ±º»çÀû ¾Ð¹ÚÀ» °ÈÇÒ °ÍÀ» ±Ç°íÇß´Ù. Also in early February the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested deployment of a Marine expeditionary brigade to Da Nang. ¶ÇÇÑ 2¿ù ÃÊ¿¡ ÇÕµ¿Âü¸ðº»ºÎ´Â ´Ù³¶¿¡ Çغ´ ¿øÁ¤¿©´ÜÀ» ¹èÄ¡ÇÒ °ÍÀ» Á¦¾ÈÇß´Ù. The commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet- nam, General William C. ºñ¿§ ³², Àª¸®¾ö C À屺, ¹Ì±º Áö¿ø »ç·É°üÀ̾ú½À´Ï´Ù. Westmoreland, responding to a mes- sage from the Joint Chiefs requesting his views on the security situation and possible troop deployments to the most vulnerable areas, indicated in a 17 February message that the security situa- tion was in fact deteriorating, and supported the Joint Chiefs' recommendation that the Marine brigade be sent to Da Na ¿þ½ºÆ®¸ð¾î·£µå´Â ¾Èº¸»óȲ°ú °¡Àå Ãë¾àÇÑ Áö¿ª¿¡ ´ëÇÑ º´·Â ¹èÄ¡ °¡´É¼º¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÇÕÂüÀÇ ¿äû¿¡ ´ëÇØ 2¿ù 17ÀÏ ¸Þ½ÃÁö¸¦ ÅëÇØ ¾Èº¸»óȲÀÌ »ç½Ç»ó ¾Çȵǰí ÀÖ´Ù°í ÁöÀûÇÏ°í Çغ´¿©´ÜÀ» ´Ù³ª·Î ÆÄ°ßÇ϶ó´Â ÇÕÂüÀÇ ±Ç°í¸¦ ÁöÁöÇß´Ù. ng. In February 1965, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs notified General Westmoreland that a major policy decision had been made "at the highest level" to "do everything possible to maxim- ize our military efforts to reverse the present unfavorable situa- tion [in South Vietnam]."1965³â 2¿ù, ÇÕÂüÀÇÀåÀº ¿þ½ºÆ®¸ð¾î·£µå À屺¿¡°Ô "ÃÖ°íÀÇ ¼öÁØ¿¡¼" Áß´ëÇÑ Á¤Ã¥ °áÁ¤ÀÌ ³»·ÁÁ³´Ù°í Å뺸Çß´Ù. "ÃÖ´ëÇÑ °¡´ÉÇÑ ¸ðµç °ÍÀ» Ç϶ó- ÇöÀçÀÇ ºÒ¸®ÇÑ »óȲÀ» ¹ÝÀü½ÃÅ°±â À§ÇÑ ±º»çÀû ³ë·ÂÀ» [³²º£Æ®³²¿¡¼]" The foundation was thus laid for steady increases in U.S. and Free World combat troop deploy- ments; it was determined to press forward to attain U.S. limited objectives despite any difficulties. µû¶ó¼, ¹Ì±¹°ú ÀÚÀ¯ ¼¼°è ÀüÅõ º´·ÂÀÇ Áö¼ÓÀûÀÎ Áõ¿øÀ» À§ÇÑ Åä´ë°¡ ¸¶·ÃµÇ¾ú°í, ¾î¶°ÇÑ ¾î·Á¿ò¿¡µµ ºÒ±¸ÇÏ°í ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ Á¦ÇÑµÈ ¸ñÇ¥ ´Þ¼ºÀ» À§ÇØ ³ë·ÂÇϱâ·Î °áÁ¤Çß´Ù. The Joint Chiefs then expanded, in a 20 February message, their recommendations to include deployment of a Republic of Korea Army division "for counterinsurgency and base security operations. À̾î ÇÕµ¿Âü¸ðº»ºÎ´Â 2¿ù 20ÀÏ ¸Þ½ÃÁö¸¦ ÅëÇØ "¹Ý°Ý ¹× ±âÁö ¾Èº¸ ÀÛÀüÀ» À§ÇÑ Çѱ¹ À°±º »ç´ÜÀÇ ¹èÄ¡"¸¦ Æ÷ÇÔÇϵµ·Ï ±Ç°íÇß´Ù. Estimated strength 21,000," as well as additional U.S. troops—Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps. ¿¹»ó º´·Â 21,000"°ú Ãß°¡ º´·Â(°ø±º, À°±º, Çغ´´ë)ÀÌ Æ÷ÇԵǾú´Ù. The message also spelled out two stumbling blocks to the recommended de- ployment. ±× ¸Þ½ÃÁö´Â ¶ÇÇÑ ±Ç°íÇÑ Å»¼±Ã¥¿¡°Ô µÎ °³ÀÇ °É¸²µ¹À» ¸»ÇØ ÁÖ¾ú´Ù. The first problem was the provision of sufficient logis- tical support and the second the establishment of joint command ù ¹ø° ¹®Á¦´Â ÃæºÐÇÑ ·ÎÁö½ºÆ½ Áö¿øÀÇ Á¦°ø°ú µÎ ¹ø°·Î´Â °øµ¿ ÁöÈÖºÎÀÇ È®¸³À̾ú´Ù. THE BACKGROUND, 1961-1966 17 because of their membership in the International Control Commission.The BACKGROUND, 1961-1966 17 ±¹Á¦ÅëÁ¦À§¿øȸ ¼Ò¼Ó. The Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of Korea found their proposals meeting opposition from within their respective national legislative bodies. Çʸ®ÇÉ°ú ´ëÇѹα¹Àº ±×µéÀÇ Á¦¾ÈÀÌ °¢ÀÚÀÇ ±¹°¡ ÀÔ¹ý ±â°ü ³»¿¡¼ ¹Ý´ë¿¡ ºÎµúÈù´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ¾Ë¾Ò´Ù. Some of this opposi- tion was due to political instability in South Vietnam from March through June 1966. ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ´ë¸³ÀÇ ÀϺδ 1966³â 3¿ùºÎÅÍ 6¿ù±îÁö ³²º£Æ®³²ÀÇ Á¤Ä¡Àû ºÒ¾ÈÁ¤À¸·Î ÀÎÇÑ °ÍÀ̾ú´Ù. Countries were reluctant to send aid when the future of South Vietnam seemed uncertain and perilous. ³²º£Æ®³²ÀÇ ¹Ì·¡°¡ ºÒÅõ¸íÇÏ°í À§Å·οö º¸ÀÌÀÚ °¢±¹Àº ¿øÁ¶¸¦ º¸³»±â¸¦ ²¨·È´Ù. While political bickering over the Vietnam issue occupied some elements of the Korean government, less publicized efforts were well under way to increase the number of Korean units in South Vietnam. º£Æ®³² ¹®Á¦¸¦ µÑ·¯½Ñ Á¤Ä¡Àû ´ÙÅùÀÌ Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎÀÇ ÀϺΠ¿ä¼Ò¸¦ Â÷ÁöÇßÁö¸¸, ³²º£Æ®³²¿¡¼ Çѱ¹ À¯´Ö ¼ö¸¦ ´Ã¸®±â À§ÇÑ ´ú ¾Ë·ÁÁø ³ë·ÂÀÌ Àß ÁøÇàµÇ°í ÀÖ¾ú´Ù. On 8 January 1966 the U.S. Ambassador in Seoul was instructed by the Secretary of State to begin prompt negotiations to obtain a Korean regiment for deployment to South Vietnam by April, and a Korean division for deployment by July. 1966³â 1¿ù 8ÀÏ, ÁÖÇÑ ¹Ì±¹´ë»ç´Â ±¹¹«Àå°üÀ¸·ÎºÎÅÍ 4¿ù±îÁö ³²º£Æ®³²¿¡ Æĺ´ÇÒ Çѱ¹¿¬´ë¸¦, 7¿ù±îÁö Æĺ´ÇÒ Çѱ¹»ç´ÜÀ» È®º¸Çϱâ À§ÇÑ ½Å¼ÓÇÑ Çù»óÀ» ½ÃÀÛÇ϶ó´Â Áö½Ã¸¦ ¹Þ¾Ò´Ù. These units were to be accompanied by the necessary combat support and combat service support elements. ÀÌµé ºÎ´ë¿¡´Â ÇÊ¿äÇÑ ÀüÅõÁö¿ø°ú ÀüÅõº¹¹«Áö¿ø¿ä¼Ò°¡ µ¿¹ÝµÉ ¿¹Á¤À̾ú´Ù. During the course of the negotiations, three major points developed by the Korean government and agreed to by the Unit- ed States were that Korean defense capability would not be jeop- ardized, that the expenses of deploying additional forces to South Vietnam would not constitute an excessive economic bur- den to the Korean people, and that the Re Çù»ó °úÁ¤¿¡¼ Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ°¡ °³¹ßÇÏ°í ºÎ´ë°¡ ÇÕÀÇÇÑ 3´ë ¿äÁ¡Àº Çѱ¹ ±¹¹æ·ÂÀÌ À§Å·οöÁöÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù´Â Á¡, ³²º£Æ®³²¿¡ Ãß°¡ º´·ÂÀ» ¹èÄ¡ÇÏ´Â ºñ¿ëÀÌ Çѱ¹ ±¹¹Î¿¡°Ô °úµµÇÑ °æÁ¦ ºÎ¸£¸ª¿¡ ÇØ´çÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù´Â Á¡, ±×¸®°í ·¹À§¼ºÀ̶ó´Â Á¡À̾ú´Ù.public of Korea would receive preferential treatment to maximize its economic benefits.Çѱ¹ÀÇ ´ëÁßµéÀº ±×µéÀÇ °æÁ¦Àû ÀÌÀÍÀ» ±Ø´ëÈÇϱâ À§ÇØ Æ¯Çý¸¦ ¹ÞÀ» °ÍÀÌ´Ù. President Chung Hee Park of Korea on 29 January ap- proved, subject to ratification by the Korean National Assembly, the South Vietnamese request for an additional Korean regi- ment and division. 1¿ù 29ÀÏ Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¹Ú Á¤Èñ ´ëÅë·ÉÀº Çѱ¹ ±¹È¸ÀÇ ºñÁØ¿¡ µû¶ó, ³²º£Æ®³²ÀÌ Ãß°¡ÀûÀÎ Çѱ¹½Ä ·¹¹ÌƼ¸àÆ®¿Í ºÐ´ÜÀ» ¿äûÇß´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» Áõ¸íÇß´Ù. In response to this announcement the United States agreed to finance all additional costs and equip as neces- sary the extra forces deployed to South Vietnam; assume the costs of overseas allowances at the agreed upon scale; provide death and disability gratuities resulting from casualties; and equip, train, and finance the replacements for the fo ÀÌ ¹ßÇ¥¿¡ ´ëÀÀÇÏ¿© ¹Ì±¹Àº ³²º£Æ®³²¿¡ ¹èÄ¡µÈ Ãß°¡ º´·Â°ú Ãß°¡ ºñ¿ë, ÇÕÀÇµÈ ±Ô¸ð¿¡ µû¸¥ ÇØ¿Ü ¼ö´ç ºñ¿ë, »ç»óÀÚ¿¡ µû¸¥ »ç¸Á ¹× Àå¾Ö ºñ¿ë Á¦°ø, ´ëÀüÀÇ Àåºñ, ÈƷüö´ç ¹× ÀÚ±Ý Áö¿ø µî¿¡ ÇÕÀÇÇß´Ù. rces de- ployed to South Vietnam.³²º£Æ®³²À¸·Î °¡´Â °è·«À» ²Ù¹Ì´Ù After several weeks of debate and be- hind-the-scenes political maneuvering, the Korean National Assembly passed the bill authorizing the dispatch of additional troops to South Vietnam. ¸î ÁÖ°£ÀÇ Åä·Ð°ú ¸·ÈÄ Á¤Ä¡ °øÀÛ ³¡¿¡ Çѱ¹ ±¹È¸´Â ³²º£Æ®³² Ãß°¡ Æĺ´À» ½ÂÀÎÇÏ´Â ¹ý¾ÈÀ» Åë°ú½ÃÄ×´Ù. On 17 February 1966, the Royal Thai Military Assistance Group, Vietnam, was activated, with the Thai Air Force contin- gent becoming a subordinate element of that group. 1966³â 2¿ù 17ÀÏ, º£Æ®³² ¿Õ¸³ ű¹ ±º»ç Áö¿ø ±×·ìÀÌ È°¼ºÈµÇ¾ú°í, ű¹ °ø±ºÀÇ °è¼ÓÀûÀÎ Áö¿ø ±×·ìÀÌ ±× ±×·ìÀÇ ÇÏÀ§ ¿ä¼Ò°¡ µÇ¾ú´Ù. In March a military working arrangement was signed between the U.S. Mili- tary Assistance Command, Vietnam, and the Royal Thai Military Assistance Group, Vietnam. Áö³ 3¿ù, ¹Ì ¹Ð¸®Å͸® Áö¿ø »ç·ÉºÎ¿Í º£Æ®³² ¿Õ¸³ ŸÀÌ ±º»ç Áö¿ø ±×·ì »çÀÌ¿¡ ±º»ç ¾÷¹« ÇùÁ¤ÀÌ Ã¼°áµÇ¾ú´Ù. By March the Joint General Staff had developed a tentative Korean force structure and presented it to the Chief, Korean 3¿ù±îÁö ÇÕµ¿ ÃÑÂü¸ðºÎ´Â ÀáÁ¤ÀûÀÎ Çѱ¹±º º´·ÂÀÇ ±¸Á¶¸¦ °³¹ßÇÏ¿© Çѱ¹±º ÃÑÂü¸ðÀå¿¡°Ô Á¦½ÃÇÏ¿´´Ù.
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