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¹Ì À°±ºÀÌ Ã³À½À¸·Î º£Æ®³²¿¡ ÀüÅõ ºÎ´ë¸¦ º¸³Â´ø 1965 ³â º½, ºÏºÎ º£Æ®³² Ãâ½ÅÀÇ ÁÖ¿ä À§ÇùÀº ÁߺΠ°í¿ø Áö´ëÀÇ °æ°è Áö¿ª¿¡ ÀÖ¾ú´Ù. 1965 ³â 7 ¿ù°æ¿¡ ºÏº£Æ®³² ÀÎÀº ±×µéÀÇ ÁÖ¿ä ÃßÁø·ÂÀÌ °í¼Óµµ·Î 19¸¦ ÅëÇØ µ¿ÂÊÀ¸·Î °íÁö´ë¸¦ Åë°úÇÏ°í ±¹Å並 µÎ ºÎºÐÀ¸·Î ³ª´©±â À§ÇØ Äû³í (Qui Nhon)À¸·Î ³ª°¬´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» º¸¿© ÁÖ¾ú´Ù. ±×µéÀº Á߽ɺο¡¼­ºÎÅÍ ºÏÂÊ°ú ³²ÂÊ ¹æÇâÀ¸·Î ÅëÁ¦¸¦ ³ÐÈ÷±â À§ÇØ ÀÏÇÏ°Ô µÉ °ÍÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
II ±º´ÜÀÇ Áß¿äÇÑ °í¿ø ÁöÇüÀº Pleiku¿Í Binh Dinh Provinces¿¡¼­ ÁÖ·Î ¹ß»ýÇß½À´Ï´Ù. Binh Dinh´Â ÁÖ¿ä µµ½Ã¸¦ Á¦¿ÜÇÏ°í´Â North Vietnamese¿Í Viet Cong¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ¿ÏÀüÈ÷ ÅëÁ¦µÇ¾ú½À´Ï´Ù. Àα¸ ¾à 80 ¸¸¸íÀÇ 2 ±º´Ü Áö¿ª¿¡¼­ °¡Àå Àα¸°¡ ¸¹Àº ÇØ¾È Áö¹æ ÀÎ Binh Dinh´Â Viet Cong¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ¼ö³â°£ Áö¹è´çÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
¹Ì±ºÀÌ µµÂøÇÑ 1965 ³â 8 ¿ù, ºó µò (Binh Dinh) Áö¹æ¿¡¼­ Äû³í (Qui Nhon)ÀÌ À¯ÀÏÇÏ°Ô ¾ÈÀüÇÑ µµ½Ã¿´½À´Ï´Ù. Qui Nhon¿¡¼­ ³ª°¡´Â ¸ðµç °í¼Óµµ·Î´Â Àû¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ÅëÁ¦µÇ¾ú½À´Ï´Ù. Pleiku Áö¹æ¿¡¼­ Pleiku µµ½Ã¿¡¼­ µµ·Î´Â ¶ÇÇÑ ºÏÂÊ º£Æ®³² »ç¶÷ ¶Ç´Â Viet Cong¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ÅëÁ¦µÇ¾ú´Ù. 2 ±º´Ü Áö¿ªÀÇ ÁÖ¿ä µµ½Ã¸¦ Á¦¿ÜÇÏ°í´Â Àû±ºÀÌ À̵¿ °æ·Î¿Í Åë½Å °æ·Î¸¦ ÅëÁ¦Ç߱⠶§¹®¿¡ ´Ù¸¥ ¸ðµç Áö¿ª »çȸ´Â À§Çù ¹Þ°í ±«·ÓÈûÀ» ¹Þ¾Ò½À´Ï´Ù. µû¶ó¼­ 1965 ³â 8 ¿ù ¹Ì±¹ÀεéÀÌ 2 ±º´Ü Áö¿ª¿¡ ±º´ë¸¦ ÆÄ°ßÇϱ⠽ÃÀÛÇßÀ» ¶§ »óȲÀº Äý ³í (Qui Nhon)ÀÇ ³²ÂÊ Áß¾Ó °í¿ø Áö´ë, ºó µò (Binh Dinh) ¹× ÅõÀÌ È£¾Æ (Tuy Hoa) Áö¿ªÀÇ 3 °³ ÁÖ¿ä Àα¸ ¹ÐÁý Áö¿ª¿¡¼­ ½É°¢Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ºÎ½ÇÈ­ µÈ ³²ºÎ º£Æ®³² ±º´ë´Â ½Å¼ÓÇÏ°í ±¤¹üÀ§ÇÑ ±º´ë Áö¿øÀÇ Çʿ伺À» ´õÇß´Ù. ÀÌ Áö¿øÀº ¹Ì±¹°ú Çѱ¹°ú °°Àº ÀÚÀ¯ ¼¼°è ±¹°¡¿¡ ÀÇÇØ Á¦°øµÇ¾ú½À´Ï´Ù.

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1954 ³â ÃÊ, À̽¸¸ ´ëÅë·ÉÀº °ø»êÁÖÀÇÀÚ¿ÍÀÇ ÀüÀïÀ» µ½±â À§ÇØ º£Æ®³²¿¡ Çѱ¹±ºÀ» º¸³»´Þ¶ó°í È£¼ÒÇß´Ù.

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ÀÌ Á¦¾ÈÀº ºê·ç½º Ŭ¶óÅ© (Bruce C. Clarke) ÁßÀåÀÌ ´ç½Ã Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¹Ì±º Àå±³¸¦ Áö¸í ÇÑ Á÷ÈÄ¿¡ ½Å¼ÓÇÏ°Ô °ÅÀý´çÇÑ ¹Ì ±¹¹«ºÎ¿¡ Áß°èµÇ¾ú´Ù. Çѱ¹±ºÀº ÆÄ°ßµÇÁö ¾Ê¾Ò°í Ãß°¡ Á¶Ä¡°¡ ¾ø¾ú½À´Ï´Ù.
10 ³â ÈÄÀÎ 1964 ³â 5 ¿ù, Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¹Ì±¹ ÇÕµ¿ ±º»ç ÀÚ¹® ±×·ì (NSF) ¼ö¼® ³ë¸Õ B. ¿¡µå¿öÁî (Norman B. Edwards) ¼ÒÀåÀº º£Æ®³²¿¡ Çѱ¹ À̵¿ À°±º ¿Ü°ú º´¿øÀ» º¸³¾ ¿¹ºñ °èȹÀ» ½ÃÀÛÇß´Ù. 1964 ³â 7 ¿ù 10 ÀÏ, ±èÁ¤Àº ±¹¹æºÎ Àå°üÀº À¯¿£±º »ç·ÉºÎÀÇ ÇعÐÅÏ H. È£Áî À屺¿¡°Ô º¸³½ ÆíÁö¿¡¼­ÀÌ °èȹÀ» È®Á¤Çß´Ù. ÇÑ Á¤ºÎ´Â º£Æ®³² Á¤ºÎ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿äû¿¡ µû¶ó À̵¿ À°±º ¿Ü°ú º´¿ø°ú 10 ¸íÀÇ Å±ǵµ (°¡¶óµ¥) °­»ç¸¦ °­È­Çß´Ù. 1964 ³â 7 ¿ù 16 ÀÏ, È£¼¼ À屺Àº ±è Àå°ü¿¡°Ô À¯¿£»ç ºÎÀå°üÀ¸·Î¼­ À̵¿ º´¿ø Á÷¿øÀ» Å¿ì°í űǵµ °­»ç¸¦ ¾ç¼ºÇÏ´Â µ¥ ÇÊ¿äÇÑ Àοø ¼®¹æ¿¡ µ¿ÀÇ ÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó°í ½è´Ù. ±×´Â ¶ÇÇÑ ¹Ì ±¹¹æºÎ°¡ÀÌ ¹èÄ¡ ºÎ´ëÀÇ À̵¿°ú Áö¼ÓÀûÀÎ ¿î¿µ¿¡ º´Âü Áö¿øÀ» Á¦°ø ÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó°í µ¡ºÙ¿´´Ù. Áö¿øÀº ÇØ´ç ÇÁ·Î±×·¥ÀÇ ÇØ´ç ÀýÂ÷¿¡ µû¶ó ±º»ç Áö¿ø ÇÁ·Î±×·¥ ä³ÎÀ» ÅëÇØ Á¦°øµÇ¾î¾ßÇÕ´Ï´Ù. Á¦°ø µÉ Àåºñ, ¹°Ç° ¹× ¼­ºñ½º¿¡´Â Á¦°ø ÇÒ ´ëÇѹα¹ÀÇ ´É·ÂÀ» ³Ñ¾î¼­´Â º»ºÎ, Àӽà ±º»ç Áö¿ø ÀÚ¹®´ÜÀÇ ½ÂÀÎÀ»¹ÞÀº À̵¿½Ä º´¿ø Å×ÀÌºí¿¡ ³ª¿­µÈ Á¶Á÷ Àåºñ ¹× ºÐ¹è ¹× ¼ö´çÀÌ Æ÷ÇԵ˴ϴÙ. ±ºÀÎ º¹Àå. °ü·Ã Àοø¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÁöºÒ, ¿©Çà ¹× ÀÏ´ç ºñ¿ë ¶Ç´Â ±âŸ ¼ö´çÀº ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ Á¦°øÇÏÁö ¾Ê¾Æ¾ßÇÕ´Ï´Ù.
ÀÌ Åä·Ð¿¡ À̾î 1964 ³â 8 ¿ù 19 ÀÏ¿¡ Çѱ¹ÀÎ 6 ¸í°ú ¹Ì±º Àå±³ 5 ¸íÀ» Æ÷ÇÔÇÏ´Â Çѱ¹ Ãø·® (¿¬¶ô) ÆÀÀÌ º£Æ®³²À» ¶°³µ´Ù. º£Æ®³² ±¹¹æºÎ¿Í º£Æ®³²ÀÇ ¹Ì±º Áö¿ø »ç·É°ü°ú ÀÏ·ÃÀÇ È¸ÀǸ¦ °ÅÄ£ ÈÄ, 1964 ³â 9 ¿ù 5 ÀÏ »çÀÌ°ø¿¡¼­ ÇÑÀÎ ´ëÇ¥¿Í º£Æ®³²ÀÎ ´ëÇ¥ °£ÀÇ ³ëµ¿ Çù¾àÀÌ Ã¼°áµÇ¾ú½À´Ï´Ù. º»ÁúÀûÀ¸·ÎÀÌ ÇùÁ¤Àº º£Æ®³² °øÈ­±¹ÀÌ º´¿øÀ» °Ç¼³ ¹× À¯ÁöÇÏ°í ¼÷¼Ò¸¦ Á¦°ø ÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó´Â Á¶°ÇÀ¸·Î Á¦°øµÇ¾ú´Ù. Çѱ¹ À°±º À̵¿ º´¿ø ºÎ´ë°¡ º´¿øÀ» ¿î¿µ ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. Çѱ¹Àº űǵµ °­»çµéÀ» Áö¿øÇÒ °ÍÀ̸ç, ¹Ì±¹Àº ¹Ì±º ´ç±¹À» ÅëÇØ 34 ¸íÀÇ Àå±³¿Í 96 ¸íÀÇ ÀÔ¿ø º´µ¿°ú 10 ¸íÀÇ °­»ç¸¦ Áö¿øÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.

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Howze°¡ ±è Àå°ü¿¡°Ô º¸³½ ¼­ÇÑ¿¡ µû¸¥ º¸Á¶ ÇÁ·Î±×·¥. ÀÌ¿¡ µû¶ó 1964 ³â 9 ¿ù 13 ÀÏ º£Æ®³² °øÈ­±¹ÀÇ ¿äû¿¡ µû¶ó ´ëÇѹα¹Àº À̵¿ À°±º ¿Ü°ú º´¿ø°ú °­»çµéÀ» ¹èÄ¡Çß´Ù.
1964 ³â 12 ¿ù º£Æ®³² Á¤ºÎÀÇ ¿äû¿¡ µû¶ó Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ´Â º£Æ®³² ±º´ë°¡ º£Æ®³² ÆòÈ­ À¯Áö ³ë·ÂÀ» Áö¿øÇϱâ À§ÇØ ÀüÀï ÇÇÇØ Áö¿ªÀ» º¹±¸ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ» µ½±â À§ÇØ ¿£Áö´Ï¾î °Ç¼³ Áö¿ø ´Üü¸¦ Á¶Á÷Çß´Ù. 1965 ³â 2 ¿ùºÎÅÍ 6 ¿ù±îÁö Çѹݵµ Çغ´´ë ¿£Áö´Ï¾î ȸ»ç ÀÎ Çѱ¹ °Ç¼³ Áö¿ø´Ü°ú Çѱ¹ Çرº LST¿Í LSM, ±×¸®°í Çѱ¹ À°±º º¸¾È ȸ»ç°¡ ÆİߵǾú´Ù. º£Æ®³² ±º»ç ±º¼ö Áö¿ø´Ü (Military Assistance Group)À¸·Î ÁöÁ¤µÈ À̵é 2,416 ¸íÀÇ ³²¼ºÀº ±×µéÀÇ º°¸í ÀÎ µµºê À¯´Ö (Dove Unit)À¸·Î ´õ Àß ¾Ë·ÁÁ³´Ù.
1965 ³â ÃÊ, º£Æ®³² Á¤ºÎ´Â Áõ°¡ÇÏ´Â º£Æ®Äá ¾Ð·Â¿¡ ´ëóÇϱâ À§ÇØ Ãß°¡ Áö¿øÀÌ ÇÊ¿äÇÏ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ¾Ë°í °ø½ÄÀûÀ¸·Î Çѱ¹¿¡ Ãß°¡ ºñÃæ ÇüÁ¦¸¦ Á¦°ø ÇÒ °ÍÀ» ¿äûÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ÀÌ ¿äûÀÇ Á÷Á¢ÀûÀÎ ÀÌÀ¯´Â º£Æ®³² ±ºÀÌ 1964 ³â °¡À» ¸ó¼ø µ¿¾ÈÀÇ È«¼ö¿Í °ü·ÃµÈ ½Ã¹Î È°µ¿ ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ®·Î ÀüȯµÇ¾ú´Ù´Â °ÍÀÌ ¾ú½À´Ï´Ù. Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ´Â ´õ ¸¹Àº Áö¿øÀÌ Á¦°ø µÉ ¼ö ÀÖÀ¸¸ç ÁöÈÖ°üÀ¸·Î ±¸¼ºµÈ Ưº° Àü´ã±â±¸ º£Æ®³²ÀÇ ±º»ç Áö¿ø ±×·ì. À°±º ±â¼úÀÚ ´ë´ë; À°±º ¼ö¼Û ȸ»ç; Çغ´ ±â¼úÀÚ È¸»ç; ½Â¹«¿ø ÇÑ ¸í°ú ÇÔ²² LST; º¸¾È ´ë´ë; ¼­ºñ½º À¯´Ö; ¿¬¶ô ´Üü ¹× À̵¿ º´¿ø (ÀÌ¹Ì º£Æ®³²¿¡ ÀÖÀ½)ÀÌ ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù.
µµºê ºÎ´ëÀÇ µµÂø Áغñ´Â 2 ¿ù 6 ÀÏ ÀÚÀ¯ ¼¼°è ±º»ç ¿øÁ¶ Á¤Ã¥ ÇùÀÇȸ¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ¿Ï·áµÇ¾ú½À´Ï´Ù. 9 ¿ù¿¡´Â Çѱ¹±º Áö¿ø´Ü°ú º£Æ®³² °ø±º°£¿¡ °³Á¤ µÈ ±º»ç ÀÛÀü °è¾àÀÌ Ã¼°áµÇ¾úÀ¸¸ç 2 ¿ù 8 ÀÏ¿¡´Â Çѱ¹±º »ç·É°ü°ú Rosson À屺 °£ÀÇ Çù¾àÀÌ Ã¼°áµÇ¾ú½À´Ï´Ù. Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ¿Í º£Æ®³² Á¤ºÎ °£ÀÇ ÇÕÀÇ¿¡´Â ¸î °¡Áö ƯÀÌÇÑ Æ¯Â¡ÀÌ Æ÷ÇԵǾú½À´Ï´Ù. Çѱ¹ÀÎÀº °ø°ÝÀ»¹ÞÁö ¾ÊÀ¸¸é ¹ß»ç ÇÒ ¼ö ¾øÁö¸¸ ¾î¶² °æ¿ì¿¡µµ Çѱ¹ ÀÛÀüÀ» À§ÇØ ¹¦»ç µÈ ±¸¿ª ¿ÜºÎÀÇ ÀûÀ» °ø°ÝÇϰųª ¹ß»ç ÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø¾ú´Ù. º£Æ®Äá °ø°ÝÀÇ °æ¿ì, º£Æ®³² ±º °íÀ§ »ç·É°üÀÌ µµ¿òÀ» ÁÙ °ÍÀÔ´Ï´Ù. Çѱ¹ÀεéÀº »óȲ¿¡ ÀÇÇØ °­Á¦µÇ°í º£Æ®³² ±º ¿¬¶ô Àå±³ÀÇ ½ÂÀÎÀ»¹ÞÁö ¾Ê´Â ÇÑ ¹Î»ç ½ÃÀ§¿¡ ¹Ý´ëÇÏÁö ¾Ê¾Æ¾ßÇß´Ù. ÀÛÀü ÅëÁ¦¿¡¼­´Â ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¹èÄ¡¿¡¼­ ¾ð±ÞµÇÁö ¾Ê¾ÒÁö¸¸ ÀüÅõ¿¡¼­ º£Æ®³² ±º °íÀ§ À°±º

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Àå±³´Â ÅëÁ¦±ÇÀ» Çà»çÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. MACV¿Í º£Æ®³² ±º´ë ¸ðµÎ Çѱ¹±º¿¡ º´Âü Áö¿øÀ» Á¦°ø ÇÒ °ÍÀ» Á¶°ÇÀ¸·ÎÇÑ´Ù. Àåºñ Ç¥¿¡ ¸í½ÃµÈ Àåºñ´Â ±º»ç Áö¿ø ÇÁ·Î±×·¥À» ÅëÇØ Á¦°øµÇ¸ç º£Æ®³² ±º´ë¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ¹ß±ÞµË´Ï´Ù. À¯Áö º¸¼ö ¼­ºñ½º´Â º£Æ®³² ±º´ë¿¡ ÀÇÇØ Á¦°ø µÉ °ÍÀÔ´Ï´Ù. º£Æ®³² Á¤ºÎ´Â ½Ò, ¼Ò±Ý, Â÷, ¼³ÅÁ, ¼îÆ®´×À» Æ÷ÇÔÇÑ ±âº» Ŭ·¡½º I ¿ëÇ°À» Á¦°øÇÕ´Ï´Ù. ±º»ç º¸Á¶ ÇÁ·Î±×·¥ (Military Assistance Program)À» ÅëÇØ ¾òÀ» ¼ö¾ø´Â º¸Ãæ ½Ä·® ¹× ±âŸ ÇÊ¿äÇÑ Àåºñ´Â MACV°¡ Á¦°øÇÕ´Ï´Ù.
ÁöÈֱǰú ÅëÁ¦±ÇÀº °ü·ÃµÈ 3 °³±¹¿¡ ¹®Á¦¸¦ ¾ß±âÇß´Ù. ÇÑ ¶§ º£Æ®³² Á¤ºÎ´Â º£Æ®³²¿¡¼­ °í¿ë µÈ ¸ðµç ÀÚÀ¯ ¼¼°è ±º´ë Áö¿ø±º¿¡ ´ëÇØ ÀûÀýÇÑ ºÎ´ë ÁöÈÖ°üÀÇ ¿ÏÀüÇÑ ÀÛÀü ÅëÁ¦¸¦ ¿øÇÑ´Ù°í Áø¼úÇß´Ù. 1965 ³â 1 ¿ù º£Æ®³² °íÀ§ Àå±³ ÀÎ À̼­ È£ À屺Àº Á¤ºÎ°¡ ¹Ì±¹ ÀÌ¿ÜÀÇ ±¹°¡ ±â°ü¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ÅëÁ¦±ÇÀ» ¼ö¶ô ÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø´Ù°í ¼±¾ðÇß´Ù. ¼±±¸Àڷμ­ Ãʱâ Çѱ¹ ¿ä¼Ò°¡ ¿þ½ºÆ® ¸ð¾î ·£µå À屺ÀÇ ÀÛÀü ÅëÁ¦ÇÏ¿¡ ³õ¿© ÀÖ´Ù´Â »ç½ÇÀ» ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ¿© ÀÚÀ¯ ¼¼°è ±º»ç Áö¿ø Á¤Ã¥ ÇùÀÇȸ°¡ Çѱ¹±ºÀÇ ÀϹÝÀûÀÎ ÀÛÀü ±â´ÉÀ» °áÁ¤ÇÏ´Â ÇÕµ¿ Âü¸ð·Î È°¿ëµÇ´Â °Í¿¡ ÇÕÀÇÇß´Ù . ÀÌ ÇùÀÇȸ´Â óÀ½¿¡ ¹Ì À°±º »ç·ÉºÎ Âü¸ð ÃÑÀå, º£Æ®³² °íÀ§ Àå±³ ¹× º£Æ®³² ÇÕÂü ÀÇÀåÀ¸·Î ±¸¼ºµÇ¾ú´Ù. ³ªÁß¿¡ ¿þ½ºÆ® ¸ð¾î ·£µå À屺Àº ±×ÀÇ Âü¸ðÀå ÀÚ¸®¸¦ Â÷ÁöÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ´Ù¾çÇÑ ºÎ Á÷¿øÀÌ ¿À´ÃÀÇ ¾÷¹«¸¦ ó¸®Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ºÐ¸íÈ÷, Âü¿©ÇÑ 3 °³±¹Àº ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ÇÕÀÇ°¡ ¸¸Á· ½º·´´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ¹ß°ßÇß´Ù. Rosson À屺°ú Lee À屺 »çÀÌÀÇ ±º»ç ÀÛÀü ¹èÄ¡´Â 2 ¿ù 8 ÀÏ¿¡ ¼­¸íµÇ¾ú°í 9 ¿ù¿¡ °³Á¤µÇ¾úÀ¸¸ç, CouncilÀÌ µµºê ºÎ´ë¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÛÀü Á¦ÇÑÀ» ¼³Á¤Çϱâ À§ÇØ »ç¿ëÇß´ø Á¶Ç×À» Æ÷ÇÔÇÏ°íÀÖ´Ù : ¸í·ÉÀº Lee À屺¿¡ ÀÇÇØ À¯Áö µÉ °ÍÀ̸ç, ÀÛÀü ÅëÁ¦´Â Westmoreland À屺 , ÇØ´ç ÀÛÀü Áö¿ªÀÇ °íÀ§ »ç·É°üÀº ±º´ëÀÇ Ã¥ÀÓÀ̵ȴÙ.
1965 ³â 2 ¿ù 25 ÀÏ¿¡ ºñµÑ±â À¯´ÖÀÇ Áø±Þ ¿ä¼Ò°¡ µµÂøÇß°í, 3 ¿ù 16 ÀÏ¿¡ ÁÖ¿ä ´çÀÌ µû¶ó °¬´Ù. ÀÌ ´Üü´Â Bien Hoa¿¡ÀÖ´Â ±âÁö Ä·ÇÁ¿¡ ÀÖ¾ú°í 1965 ³â¿¡´Â 3 °³ÀÇ ´Ù¸®, 4 °³ÀÇ Çб³, 2 °³ÀÇ º´¿ø, 2 °³ÀÇ Çܸ´ »ç¹«½ÇÀ» °Ç¼³ÇßÀ¸¸ç ¸¹Àº ´Ù¸¥ »ç¼ÒÇÑ ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ®µµ ¼öÇàÇß½À´Ï´Ù. Dove UnitÀÇ ÀÇ·á ¿ä¼Ò´Â ¾à 3 ¸¸ ¸íÀÇ È¯ÀÚ¸¦ Ä¡·áÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ¿þ½ºÆ® ¸ð¾î ·£µå (Westmoreland)ÀÇ ±Ç°í¿¡ µû¶ó Çѱ¹ÀÎ ±×·ìÀº 6 ¿ù 27 ÀÏ¿¡ 272 ¸í°ú ³²¼ºÀÌ ´Ã¾î ³µÀ¸¸ç,

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7 ¿ù 9 ÀÏ 2 ´ëÀÇ LSM (Âø·ú¼±, ±â°èÈ­ µÊ).
ÀÌ ±º´ë ÆÄ°ß¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹Ì±¹°ú Çѱ¹ ´ç±¹°£ÀÇ ³íÀÇ°¡ °ð À̾îÁ³´Ù. 1965 ³â 6 ¿ù 2 ÀÏ À¯¿£±º »ç·ÉºÎ Àå°ü°ú ±¹¹æºÎ Àå°üÀÌ ¸¸³­ ÀÚ¸®¿¡¼­ Á¸½¼ ´ë ±¹¹« Àå°üÀº Á¸½¼ ´ëÅë·É°ú ¹Ú Àü ´ëÅë·ÉÀÌ °íÀÌÁî¹Ì ÃѸ®ÀÇ ¿ö½ÌÅÏ ¹æ¹®À» °è±â·Î °íÀ§±Þ ȸ´ãÀ» °®°í 1965 ³â 5 ¿ù Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ´Â º£Æ®³²¿¡ À°±º º»ºÎ¸¦ ÆÄ°ßÇϱâ·Î °áÁ¤Çß´Ù. Çѱ¹ À°±º ¿¬´ë¸¦ Æ÷ÇÔÇÏ¿© 1 ±º´ë ¿¬´ë¸¦ Á¦¿ÜÇÑ ºÎ¼­´Â Çѱ¹ À°±º À屺ÀÌ ÁöÈÖÇؾßÇß´Ù. À̾ Çѱ¹Àº F-86 ÀüÅõ±â¸¦ º¸³»¾î Çѱ¹±º¿¡ ÀüÅõ Áö¿øÀ» Á¦°ø ÇÒ °ÍÀ» Á¦¾ÈÇß´Ù.
±è ±¹¹æ Àå°üÀº ¶ÇÇÑ Çѱ¹±º¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÓ±Ý ÀλóÀÌ ³íÀǵǾúÀ¸¸ç, È®°íÇÑ °ø¾àÀº ¾ø¾úÁö¸¸ ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ µµ¿ï °ÍÀ̶ó°í ÃßÃøÇß´Ù. Çѱ¹Àº º£Æ®³²¿¡ º»ºÎ¸¦µÎ°í Àֱ⠶§¹®¿¡ ±è ±¹¹æ Àå°üÀº ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¹Ì±º º´·ÂÀ» ÁÙÀ̱âÀ§ÇÑ Á¦¾ÈÀ» °è¼ÓÇؼ­´Â ¾ÈµÇ¸ç ±º»ç Áö¿ø ÇÁ·Î±×·¥À» Áß´ÜÇÏ´Â ´ë½Å¿¡ Çѱ¹¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Áö¿ø. ¸¶Áö¸·À¸·Î Àå°üÀº ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ Çѱ¹ °ü¸®µé¿¡ ÀÇÇØ °ü¸®µÇ´Â "ºñ°ø½Ä"±â±ÝÀ» Á¶¼ºÇÏ°í º£Æ®³²¿¡¼­ »ç¸ÁÇϰųª ºÎ»ó´çÇÑ ±ºÀÎ °¡Á·¿¡°Ô ¿¬±ÝÀ» Áö±ÞÇϵµ·Ï ¿äûÇß´Ù.
1965 ³â 6 ¿ù 23 ÀÏ ±è ±¹¹æºÎ Àå°üÀº À̹ø¿¡ À¯¿£»ç ÁöÈÖ°ü°ú ¸¸³µ½À´Ï´Ù. À̹ø¿¡´Â Çѱ¹±º º´·Â ¹èÄ¡¿Í °ü·ÃµÈ ¹®Á¦¸¦ ³íÀÇÇϱâ À§ÇØ ÁÖÇÑ ¹Ì±º »ç·É°üÀ¸·Î¼­ÀÇ ´É·Â¿¡ ´ëÇØ À̾߱âÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ±¸Ã¼ÀûÀÎ °èȹÀÌ ¼ö¸³µÇ±â Àü¿¡ Çѱ¹±ºÀº ±¹È¸ÀÇ ½ÂÀÎÀ» ¾ò¾î¾ßÇß´Ù. ½ÂÀÎÀº ¹Ýµå½Ã ÀÚµ¿Àû ÀÎ °ÍÀº ¾Æ´ÏÁö¸¸, Àå°üÀº Á¶±â ½ÂÀÎÀ» ¿¹»óÇÏ°í 7 ¿ù ¸» ¶Ç´Â 1965 ³â 8 ¿ù ÃÊ¿¡ ¹èÄ¡ ÀÏÀ» ½ÃÇè ÀûÀ¸·Î ¼³Á¤Çß´Ù.
Àå°üÀº ±¹È¸¿¡ ¹èÆ÷ Á¦¾È¼­¸¦ Á¦ÃâÇϱâ Àü¿¡ ´ÙÀ½ Ç׸ñ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ µ¿ÀÇ¿Í Áö¿øÀ» ¿øÇß´Ù.
1. Çѱ¹ÀÇ ÇöÀç ¹Ì±¹°ú Çѱ¹ÀÇ ÃµÀå õÀå À¯Áö.
2. Àåºñ ¼ö´ç°ú ÇØ¾ç ºÎ¹®À» Æ÷ÇÔÇÑ 17 °³ÀÇ Á¤±Ô ºÎ¼­ÀÇ 100 %¿¡ ÇØ´çÇÏ´Â 3 °³ÀÇ ÀüÅõ Áغñ ¿¹ºñ ºÎ´ëÀÇ Àåºñ´Â È­·Â, ±âµ¿ ¹× ½ÅÈ£ ´É·Â¿¡ ¿µÇâÀ» ¹ÌÄ¡´Â ÁÖ¿ä Ç׸ñÀ¸·Î Çѱ¹ ¹æÀ§ ż¼ ¾àÈ­¸¦ ¹æÁöÇÕ´Ï´Ù.

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3. ºÐ´Ü ¹èÄ¡ Àü°ú µ¿ÀÏÇÑ ¼öÁØÀÇ ±º»ç º¸Á¶ ÇÁ·Î±×·¥ ÀÚ±Ý Áö¿ø.
º£Æ®³²¿¡¼­ÀÇ ±Ù¹«¸¦ ¸ñÇ¥·ÎÇÏ´Â Çѱ¹ ÀüÅõ ºÎ´ëÀÇ ÀÓ¹«, ¾ß¿µÁö, ÁöÈÖ Ã¤³Î ¹× º´Âü Áö¿ø¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Á¶±â È®ÀÎ.
5. Çѱ¹ »ç¾÷´Ü ±¸¼ºÀ»À§ÇÑ ¼Ò±Ô¸ð ±âȹ ±×·ì ¼³¸³.
6. º£Æ®³² Çѹݵµ º»ºÎ °£ Á÷Á¢ Åë½Å¸Á ±¸ÃàÀ»À§ÇÑ ½ÅÈ£ Àåºñ Á¦°ø
7. Çѱ¹ »ç¾÷ºÎÀÇ À̵¿À»À§ÇÑ ¿î¼Û ¼ö´Ü ¹× Àη ¹× ¹°ÀÚÀÇ ±³Ã¼ ¹× ±³Ã¼¿Í °°Àº ÈÄ¼Ó ¿ä±¸ »çÇ׿¡ ´ëÇÑ Á¦°ø.
8. º£Æ®³²¿¡ÀÖ´Â Çѱ¹ÀÎ ´ÜÀ§¿Í °³Àο¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀçÁ¤Àû Áö¿ø Á¦°ø. ¹Ì±º ¿ä¿ø°ú µ¿ÀÏÇÑ ºñÀ²ÀÇ ÀüÅõ ±Ù¹« ÀÓ±Ý, Á÷¹« »ó »ç¸Á ¶Ç´Â Àå¾Ö¿¡ ´ëÇÑ º¯»ó ¹× º¸»ó, Çѱ¹ÀÎÀÌ °í¿ë ÇÑ º£Æ®³² ¿øÁֹΠÁ÷¿øÀÇ ±Þ¿© ´ÜÀ§.
9. Çѱ¹°ú º£Æ®³² °£ÀÇ ÀÇ·á Çdz­ ¹× ¿¬¶ôÀ»À§ÇÑ 4 ´ëÀÇ C-123 Ç×°ø±â Á¦°ø.
10. Çѱ¹ ¹æ¼Û »ç¾÷ºÎ°¡ ¹Ý °ø»êÁÖÀÇ ¹æ¼Û, ½É¸®Àü ¹× ¹æÇØ ÀüÆÄ »ç¾÷À» ¼öÇàÇÏ°í Çѱ¹ °¡Á¤ ´º½º, ÀüÀï ´º½º ¹× ¿À¶ô ÇÁ·Î±×·¥À» Á¦°ø ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï ÇöÀå ¹æ¼Û ¼³ºñ¸¦ Á¦°øÇÑ´Ù.
¸î ³â ÈÄÀÎ 1971 ³â 1 ¿ù, µå¿þÀÌÆ® À屺Àº 1965 ³â 7 ¿ù 1 ÀÏ¿¡ È£Áî À屺À» À¯¿£±º »ç·É°üÀ¸·Î ÀÓ¸íÇÏ¿©ÀÌ ¸í´Ü¿¡ ´ëÇØ ³íÆòÇß´Ù.
Ãʱâ Çѱ¹ û±¸¼­ (À§½Ã¸®½ºÆ®)´Â ÈǸ¢Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
±âº»ÀûÀ¸·Î Çѱ¹±ºÀº ¹Ì±º°ú µ¿ÀÏÇÑ ÀÓ±ÝÀ» ¹Þ°í, ¸ðµç ¹Ì±º Àåºñ¸¦ ¹èÄ¡ÇÏ°í, Çѱ¹ À°±º, Çرº ¹× °ø±ºÀ» Çö´ëÈ­Çϱ⸦ ¿øÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
 ³ª´Â ±×µéÀÇ ¹ý¾ÈÀÌ ¿ÏÀüÈ÷ ºñÇÕ¸®ÀûÀÌ°í ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ µ¿ÀÇÇÏ´Â ¾î¶² ±âȸµµ ¾ø´Ù´Â ´ë»çÀÇ µ¿ÀÇ·Î ±×µé¿¡°Ô ¸»Çß´Ù. ÃÖÁ¾ ŸÇù¾È¿¡´Â ¹èÄ¡ µÈ ±º´ë¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ´ëÆø ÀÓ±Ý Àλó, ¿ì¸®°¡ Á¦°ø ÇÒ ¼öÀÖ´Â ÁÁÀº Àåºñ¿Í ´ëÇѹα¹°úÀÇ »çÀü ÇùÀǾøÀÌ ¹Ì±ºÀÌ Çѱ¹¿¡¼­ ö¼öÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀ» °ÍÀ̶ó´Â ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¾à¼ÓÀÌ Æ÷ÇԵǾîÀÖ´Ù.
ÈÄÀÚ´Â Çѱ¹Àε鿡°Ô, Çѱ¹ÀÇ ½ÂÀÎ ¾øÀÌ´Â ¹Ì±ºÀÌ Ã¶¼öÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀ» °ÍÀ» ÀǹÌÇß´Ù. ºÐ¸íÈ÷, ÈÄÀÚ´Â Áö±ÝÀº Çѱ¹¿¡¼­ 7 ¹Ì±¹ º»ºÎÀÇ Ã¶¼ö¿Í ÇÔ²² ºÐ¸íÇÏ´Ù »ç°ÇÀÌ ¾Æ´Ï¾ú´Ù.
¹Ì ±¹¹«ºÎ¿Í ±¹¹æºÎ´Â ±Ã±ØÀûÀ¸·Î Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¿ä±¸ »çÇ×À» ÇØ°áÇß½À´Ï´Ù.

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3 ´ëÀÇ ÀüÅõ Áغñ ¿¹ºñ ºÎ´ë°¡ °øÀÎ Á¶Á÷ ¹× Àåºñ Ç¥ÀÇ 100 %¿¡ Àåºñ¸¦ °®Ãßµµ·Ï ¿ä±¸ ÇÑ °ÍÀº ¹Ì±º »ç·É°üÀÌ ±º»ç Áö¿ø ÇÁ·Î±×·¥ ±â±ÝÀÇ °¡¿ë¼º¿¡ Å©°Ô ÀÇÁ¸ÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù°í ¹àÇû´Ù. Çѱ¹±ºÀ» º£Æ®³²¿¡ Æĺ´ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ±º»ç Áö¿ø ÇÁ·Î±×·¥ ±â±Ý¿¡ ¿µÇâÀ» ¹ÌÄ¥ ¼ö ÀÖÁö¸¸ ¿ªÈ¿°ú ¿©ºÎ´Â ¿¹ÃøÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø´Ù. °í·ÁÁßÀÎ °ÍÀº Çѱ¹ ±º º¸Á¶ ÇÁ·Î±×·¥ ±â±ÝÀ» »ç¿ëÇÏ¿© ÇØ´ç ºÎ¼­ÀÇ Áغñ ¹× ÆÄ°ß ¹× º£Æ®³²¿¡ÀÖ´Â µ¿¾È ÇØ´ç ºÎ¼­ÀÇ Áö¿ø¿¡ ÀÚ±ÝÀ» Á¦°ø ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ̾ú´Ù. ¼±±³ºÎ, ¾ß¿µÁö ¹× ±âŸ ÀÏ»óÀûÀÎ ¿ä±¸ »çÇ׿¡ ´ëÇÑ Á¶±â È®ÀÎÀº ÅÂÆò¾ç Áö¿ª »ç·É°üÀÇ Á¤º¸¿¡ ´Þ·ÁÀÖ´Ù. Çѱ¹ÀÎ ´ÜüÀÇ Á¶Á÷À» °áÁ¤Çϱâ À§ÇØ ¼Ò±Ô¸ð ±âȹ ±×·ì¿¡ ³²¼ºÀ» Á¦°øÇؾßÇÑ´Ù´Â ¿ä±¸°¡ Áï½Ã ½ÂÀεǾú½À´Ï´Ù.
Çѱ¹°ú Çѱ¹ º»ºÎ °£ÀÇ Á÷Á¢ Åë½ÅÀ»À§ÇÑ ½ÅÈ£ Àåºñ ¿äûÀº ½ÂÀεÇÁö ¾Ê¾Ò´Ù. °íÁÖÆÄ ¹«¼± Àåºñ¸¦ »ç¿ëÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ¾úÁö¸¸ Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¹Ì±º »ç·É°ü ÀÎ General Beach´Â ÇÑÀεéÀÌ ÇöÀçÀÇ ¹Ì±¹ Åë½Å ½Ã½ºÅÛÀ» ÀÏ¹Ý »ç¿ëÀÚ ±â¹ÝÀ¸·Î »ç¿ëÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ ´õ ³ªÀº ÇØ°áÃ¥À̶ó°í ´À²¼½À´Ï´Ù. ÁöÈÖ°üÀº ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ ±× ºÎ¼­¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¼ö¼ÛÀ» Á¦°øÇؾßÇÑ´Ù´Â Á¡¿¡ µ¿ÀÇÇß´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ¹Ì±¹ ÇØ¿îÀÇ °¡¿ë¼º¿¡ µû¶ó ÀϺΠÇѱ¹ ¼±¹ÚÀÌ »ç¿ëµÇ¾î¾ß ÇÒ ¼öµµÀÖ´Ù.
º£Æ®³²¿¡ÀÖ´Â Çѱ¹Àεé°ú °³Àε鿡 ´ëÇÑ ÀçÁ¤Àû Áö¿ø ¿äûÀº ºÒ½ÂÀÎÀ¸·Î ¸¸³µ´Ù. Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¹Ì±º »ç·É°üÀº ÀüÅõ ±Ù¹« ÀÓ±ÝÀ», ƯÈ÷ ¹Ì±º¿¡°Ô ÁöºÒ ÇÑ °Í°ú °°Àº ºñÀ²·Î ¼±È£ÇÏÁö´Â ¾Ê¾ÒÁö¸¸ ÇØ¿Ü ¼ö´ç Áö±Þ°ú ÀÏÄ¡Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ »ç¸Á ±Þ¿©¸¦ Áö±ÞÇϰųª Àå¾Ö ³³ºÎ¸¦ÇؾßÇÑ´Ù¸é, ±Ý¸®´Â ÇöÀç Çѱ¹ ¹ý¿¡ µû¶ó ÀÏȸ¼ºÀ¸·Î ¸¸ ¼³Á¤µÇ¾î ÀÖ¾î¾ßÇÑ´Ù. ¹Ì±¹Àº Çѱ¹±º¿¡ ÀÇÇÑ º£Æ®³² ±¹ÀûÀÚÀÇ °í¿ë¿¡ ´ëÇØ Á÷Á¢ÀûÀ¸·Î ºñ¿ëÀ» ÁöºÒÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀ» °ÍÀÌÁö¸¸, Çѱ¹°ú º£Æ®³² °£ÀÇ ÇùÁ¤¿¡ ±×·¯ÇÑ °æºñ¸¦ Æ÷ÇÔÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ ¹Ù¶÷Á÷ÇÏ´Ù. »ç·É°üÀº C-123 Ç×°ø±â 4 ´ë¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿äûÀÌ ÀÌÀü ¿î¼Û ¿äû°ú Áߺ¹ µÈ °ÍÀ¸·Î º¸ÀÎ ÀÌÈÄ, ¹Ì±¹Àº Çѱ¹ÇàÀ» À§ÇØ ¿¹Á¤µÈ Ç×°øÆíÀ» Á¦°øÇϰųª ¹Ì±¹ ³» ´Ù¸¥ Á¤±â Ç×°øÆíÀ» ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ¿© Çѱ¹ÇàÀ» ¿¹¾àÇؾßÇÑ´Ù°í »ý°¢Çß´Ù.
¾ð¶æº¸±â¿¡ ÇöÀå ¹æ¼Û ¼³ºñ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿äûÀº ÀÌ¹Ì º£Æ®³²¿¡¼­ ½ÃÇàÁßÀÎ ½É¸®Àü ÇÁ·Î±×·¥°ú Ãæµ¹ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î º¸¿´À¸ ³ª ¹®Á¦ÀÇ ÃÖÁ¾ ÇØ°áÀº ÇöÀå¿¡¼­ÀÇ ÀÇ°ßÀ» ±â´Ù·Á¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
1965 ³â 7 ¿ù 13 ÀÏ ¹Ì±¹ ±¹¹«ºÎ´Â

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±×·¯³ª Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¾çº¸´Â Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ°¡ ÃëÇÑ Á¶Ä¡·Î ÀÎÇØ ¹ß»ýÇÏ´Â ¿¹»ê ÀúÃàÀÌ Çѱ¹Àο¡ ´ëÇÑ »ó´çÇÑ ±º º¹¹« ¹× ÀÓ±Ý ÀÎ»ó¿¡ ±â¿©ÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó´Â Á¡À» ÀÌÇØÇϸ鼭 ÀÌ·ç¾îÁ³½À´Ï´Ù. »ç½Ç, Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ´Â º£Æ®³²¿¡ »ç¾÷ºÎ¸¦ ¹èÄ¡ÇÏ´Â µ¥ Ãß°¡ ºñ¿ëÀ» µéÀÌÁö´Â ¾ÊÀ» °ÍÀÌÁö¸¸ ¸¹Àº °æÁ¦Àû ÀÌÁ¡À» È®º¸ ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¹Ý¸é¿¡ ÀÌ¹Ì º£Æ®³²¿¡ÀÖ´Â Çѱ¹ÀεéÀÇ ¹Ì±¹¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºñ¿ëÀº ¿¬°£ $ 2,000,000¿¡ ´ÞÇÏ¸ç º£Æ®³²ÀÇ Çѱ¹ »ç¾÷ºÎÀÇ ¿î¿µ ºñ¿ëÀº $ 43,000,000À¸·Î Ãß»êµË´Ï´Ù.
1965 ³â 7 ¿ù 16 ÀÏ¿¡ ÀÖ¾ú´ø ÀÌÈÄÀÇ ´ëÈ­¿¡¼­ Çѱ¹±º »ç·É°üÀº Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎÀÇ ¿äûÀ» ÇØ°áÇÒ ¶§ °áÁ¤µÈ ´Ù¸¥ °áÁ¤µéÀ» ÅÂÆò¾ç Áö¿ª »ç·É°ü¿¡°Ô Å뺸Çß´Ù. Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¹Ì±º »ç·É°ü°ú ÁÖÇÑ ¹Ì±º »ç·É°ü ÀÎ À©½º µå·Ó D. ºê¶ó¿î (Winthrop D. Brown)Àº Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¹Ì±º °¨Ãà°ú °ü·ÃÇÏ¿© Á¸½¼ ´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ ¹Ì±º °¨Ãà °èȹÀÌ ¾ø´Ù´Â Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎÀÇ È®½ÅÀ» Ç¥¸í ÇÑ ÆíÁö¸¦ ÀÛ¼ºÇß´Ù. ÁÖÇÑ ¹Ì±ºÀÇ Àç¹èÄ¡¿¡ ´ëÇؼ­´Â Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ °ü°èÀÚ¿Í ¹Ì¸®»óÀÇ ÇÒ ¿¹Á¤ÀÌ´Ù.
8 ¿ù¿¡ À̸£¸é Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ´Â ±ººÎ´ëÀÇ ±º´ë ±¸Á¶¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Çù¾àÀ» ¸Î¾î º´·Â Áõ°­À» Áö¿øÇßÁö¸¸ ÅëÁ¦¿Í ¸í·É ¹× ÅëÀÏ µÈ Çѱ¹ º»ºÎÀÇ ±º»çÀû Ãø¸éÀº ¿©ÀüÈ÷ ​​³íÀÇ ÁßÀÌ´Ù. Çѱ¹±º¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÅëÇÕ Àåºñ ¸ñ·Ï, °­µµ ¹× Çغ´·Â, Çѱ¹±º Áö¿ø ¸í·É¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¼ö´ç Ç¥°¡ °³¹ßµÇ¾î ¿þ½ºÆ® ¸ð¾î ·£µå À屺¿¡°Ô Àü´ÞµÇ¾ú½À´Ï´Ù. ¹°·ù ºÐ¾ß¿¡¼­ Class II, IV ¹× V °ø±ÞÀÇ ÃÊ±â ¹× ÈÄ¼Ó Áö¿øÀÌ ÇØ°áµÇ¾úÁö¸¸ Á¤º¸°¡ ¼ö½Å µÉ ¶§±îÁö Class III °ø±Þ ¹®Á¦¸¦ ÇØ°áÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø¾ú½À´Ï´Ù

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¶ÇÇÑ º£Æ®³²¿¡¼­ Çѱ¹±º¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ Áö¿ø Á¶°Ç¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÇÕÀǸ¦ ¸ð»öÇß´Ù. ±× °á°ú ¹Ì±¹°ú Çѱ¹ °£ÀÇ ÇÕÀÇ´Â ½ÇÁúÀûÀ¸·Î ´ÙÀ½°ú °°Àº Á¶°ÇÀ» Á¦°øÇß´Ù.
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CHAPTER VI

The Republic of Korea

 

In the spring of 1965 when the American Army first sent combat units to Vietnam, the principal threat to the country from the North Vietnamese was in the border areas of the Central Highlands. By July 1965 the North Vietnamese had shown that their main thrust was to come through the highlands, eastward by means of Highway 19, and out to Qui Nhon to split the country into two parts; they would then work from a central area to broaden their control in both northerly and southerly directions.
The critical highlands terrain in II Corps was primarily in Pleiku and Binh Dinh Provinces. Except for major towns, Binh Dinh was completely controlled by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. The most populated coastal province in the II Corps area, with roughly 800,000 people, Binh Dinh had been dominated by the Viet Cong for many years.
In August 1965, when American troops arrived, Qui Nhon was the only secure town in the province of Binh Dinh. All the highways leading out from Qui Nhon were controlled by the enemy. In Pleiku Province the roads out of Pleiku City were also controlled by the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong. With the exception of the main towns in II Corps area, all the other communities were threatened and harassed because the enemy controlled routes of travel and communication. Thus, in August 1965 when the Americans began bringing their forces into the II Corps area, the situation was serious in the three major populated areas-the Central Highlands, Binh Dinh, and the Tuy Hoa area to the south of Qui Nhon. A demoralized South Vietnam Army compounded the need for quick, extensive military assistance. This assistance was provided by the United States and Free World countries such as Korea.

The Korean Commitment
In early 1954 the Republic of Korea's President Syngman Rhee offered, without solicitation, to send a Korean Army element to Vietnam to assist in the war against the Communists.

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This proposal was made to Lieutenant General Bruce C. Clarke, ranking U.S. officer in Korea at the time, who relayed it to the Department of State where it was promptly turned down. Korean forces were not sent, nor was there any further action.
Ten years later, in May 1964, Major General Norman B. Edwards, Chief, US Joint Military Advisory Group, Korea, began preliminary planning to send a Korean Mobile Army Surgical Hospital to Vietnam. On 10 July 1964 the Korean Minister of National Defense, Kim Suing Eun, confirmed this planning in a letter to General Hamilton H. Howze, then Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, stating that the government of the Republic of Korea was prepared to send one reinforced Mobile Army Surgical Hospital and ten Tae-kwon-do (karate) instructors to the Republic of Vietnam upon the request of that government. On 16 July 1964, General Howze wrote Minister Kim that in his capacity as chief of the United Nations Command he would concur in the release of such personnel as would be required to staff the mobile hospital and provide the Tae-kwon-do instructors. He further noted that the US Department of Defense would provide logistical support for the movement and continued operation of these deploying forces. The support was to be provided through Military Assistance Program channels in accordance with the applicable procedures of that program. Equipment, supplies, and services to be provided were to include organizational equipment listed in the mobile hospital table of distribution and allowances as approved by Headquarters, Provisional Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea, beyond the capabilities of the Republic of Korea to provide, and subsistence and clothing for military personnel. Pay, travel, and per diem costs or other allowances for the personnel involved were not to be provided by the United States.
Following these discussions the Republic of Korea Survey (Liaison) Team, which included six Korean and five US officers, departed on 19 August 1964 for Vietnam. After a series of meetings with officials of both the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense and the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, working agreements were signed on 5 September 1964 at Saigon between the Korean and Vietnamese representatives. In essence, the agreements provided that the Republic of Vietnam would build and maintain the hospital and provide quarters; the Korean Army mobile hospital unit would operate the hospital; Korea would provide Tae-kwon-do instructors, and the United States would support the thirty-four officers and ninety-six enlisted men of the hospital unit and the ten instructors through the Mil-

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nary Assistance Program in accordance with Howze's letter to Minister Kim. Accordingly, on 13 September 1964, at the request of the Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Korea deployed the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital and instructors.
In late December 1964, after a request from the Republic of Vietnam, the Korean government organized an engineer construction support group to assist the Vietnamese armed forces in restoring war-damaged areas in furtherance of Vietnamese pacification efforts. During the period February to June 1965, a Korean construction support group, a Korean Marine Corps engineer company, Korean Navy LST's and LSM's, and a Korean Army security company were dispatched. These elements, totaling 2,416 men, designated the Republic of Korea Military Assistance Group, Vietnam, were better known by their nickname, Dove Unit.
In early 1965, the government of Vietnam, aware that additional assistance was needed to combat the growing Viet Cong pressure, officially asked the Republic of Korea to provide additional noncombatants. The immediate reason for this request was that Vietnamese troops had been diverted to civic action projects related to the heavy flooding during the fall monsoon in 1964. The Korean government agreed that more support could be provided and undertook to supply a task force composed of the commander of the Republic of Korea Military Assistance Group, Vietnam; an Army engineer battalion; an Army transport company; a Marine engineer company; one LST with crew; a security battalion; a service unit; a liaison group, and a mobile hospital (already in Vietnam).
Arrangements for arrival of the Dove Unit were completed by the Free World Military Assistance Policy Council on 6 February. In September a revised military working agreement was signed between the Korean Military Assistance Group and the Vietnam Air Force and on 8 February an arrangement between the commander of the Korean group and General Rosson. The arrangement between the Korean and Vietnamese governments included several unusual features. The Koreans were not to fire unless attacked, but in any event, could not fire on or pursue the enemy outside the area delineated for Korean operations. In case of a Viet Cong attack, the senior Vietnam Army commander in the area would provide assistance. Koreans were not to act against civil demonstrations unless forced to by circumstances and authorized by a Vietnam Army liaison officer. Operational control was not mentioned in these arrangements, although it was implied that in combat action the senior Vietnam Army

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officer would exercise control. The arrangements provided that both MACV and the Vietnam armed forces would provide logistical support for the Korean force. Equipment specified in tables of equipment would be provided through the Military Assistance Program and issued by the Vietnam Army. Maintenance services would be provided by the Vietnam Army. Basic Class I supplies, including rice, salt, tea, sugar, and shortening would be provided by the Vietnam government; supplemental rations and other necessary equipment not available through the Military Assistance Program would be supplied by MACV.
Command and control posed a problem for the three nations involved. At one point, the government of Vietnam stated that it desired full operational control by the appropriate corps commander over all Free World military assistance forces employed in Vietnam. In January 1965 Major General Lee Sae Ho, Senior Korean officer in Vietnam, declared that his government could not accept control by any national authority other than the United States. Using as a precedent the fact that the initial Korean element had been placed under the operational control of General Westmoreland, an agreement was reached whereby the Free World Military Assistance Policy Council was utilized as a combined staff to determine the general operational functions of the Korean force. This council was composed initially of the chief of staff of the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the senior Korean officer in Vietnam, and the chief of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff. Later General Westmoreland took the place of his chief of staff. Various subordinate staffs handled day-today operations. Evidently, the three nations involved found these arrangements to be satisfactory. The military working arrangement between General Rosson and General Lee, signed on 8 February and revised in September, contained provisions which the council used to establish operating limits for the Dove Unit: command would be retained by General Lee, operational control would belong to General Westmoreland, and the force would be responsible to the senior commander in any given area of operations.
On 25 February 1965 the advance element of the Dove Unit arrived, followed on 16 March by the main party. The group was located at a base camp in Bien Hoa and during 1965 constructed three bridges, four schools, two dispensaries, and two hamlet offices, as well as accomplishing numerous other minor projects. Medical elements of the Dove Unit treated some 30,000 patients. In line with recommendations by Westmoreland, the Korean group was increased by 272 officers and men on 27 June and by

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two LSM's (landing ships, mechanized) on 9 July.
Further discussions between the US and Korean authorities on this dispatch of troops soon followed. At a meeting between the Korean Minister of National Defense and the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, on 2 June 1965, the Korean Minister disclosed that as a result of high-level talks between President Johnson and President Park during the latter's visit to Washington in May 1965 the Korean government had decided to send an Army division to Vietnam. The division, minus one Army regiment but including a Korean Marine regiment, was to be commanded by a Korean Army general. Subsequently, Korea also proposed to send an F-86 fighter squadron to provide combat support for Korean ground elements.
Korean Defense Minister Kim also disclosed that a pay raise for Korean troops had been discussed, and although no firm commitment had been made, the inference was that the United States would help. Because Korea would have one of its divisions in Vietnam, Defense Minister Kim felt that the United States should not continue to entertain proposals to reduce US troop strength in Korea, and instead of suspending the Military Assistance Program transfer project should increase the monetary level of the assistance to Korea. Finally, the minister requested that the United States establish an "unofficial" fund to be administered by Korean officials and used in pension payments to the families of soldiers killed or wounded in Vietnam.
On 23 June 1965 Defense Minister Kim again met with Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, this time in the tatter's capacity as Commander, US Forces, Korea, to discuss the problems connected with the deployment of the Korean division to Vietnam. Before concrete plans could be drawn up, however, the Korean Army needed to obtain the approval of the National Assembly. Although approval was not necessarily automatic, the minister expected early approval and tentatively established the date of deployment as either late July or early August 1965.
The minister desired US agreement to and support of the following items before submitting the deployment proposal to the National Assembly:
1. Maintenance of current US and Korean force ceilings in Korea.
2. Equipment of the three combat-ready reserve divisions to 100 percent of the table of equipment allowance and the seventeen regular divisions, including the Marine division, with major items affecting firepower, maneuver, and signal capabilities to avoid weakening the Korean defense posture.

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3. Maintenance of the same level of Military Assistance Program funding for Korea as before the deployment of the division.
4. Early confirmation of mission, bivouac area, command channels, and logistical support for Korean combat units destined for service in Vietnam.
5. Establishment of a small planning group to determine the organization of the Korean division.
6. Provision of signal equipment for a direct and exclusive communication net between Korea and Korean forces headquarters in Vietnam.
7. Provision of transportation for the movement of the Korean division and for subsequent requirements such as rotation and replacement of personnel and supplies.
8. Provision of financial support to Korean units and individuals in Vietnam, including combat duty pay at the same rate as paid to US personnel, gratuities and compensations for line-of-duty deaths or disability, and salaries of Vietnamese indigenous personnel hired by Korean units.
9. Provision of four C-123 aircraft for medical evacuation and liaison between Korea and Vietnam.
10. Provision of a field broadcasting installation to enable the Korean division to conduct anti-Communist broadcasts, psychological warfare, and jamming operations and to provide Korean home news, war news, and entertainment programs.
Some years later, in January 1971, General Dwight E. Beach, who had succeeded General Howze as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, on 1 July 1965, commented on the list.
The initial Korean bill (wish-list) was fantastic. Basically, the ROK wanted their troops to receive the same pay as the Americans, all new US equipment for deploying troops and modernization of the entire ROK Army, Navy and Air Force. I told them with the Ambassador's concurrence that their bill was completely unreasonable and there was no chance whatever of the US agreeing to it. The final compromise included a very substantial increase in pay for the troops deployed, as much good equipment as we could then furnish and a US commitment that no US troops would be withdrawn from Korea without prior consultation with the ROK. The latter, to the Koreans, meant that no US troops would be withdrawn without ROK approval. Obviously, the latter was not the case as is now evident with the withdrawal of the 7th US Division from Korea.
The US Department of State and Department of Defense ultimately resolved the matter of the Korean requirements.

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The request that three combat-ready reserve divisions be equipped to 100 percent of their authorized table of organization and equipment was, the commander of US forces in Korea stated, heavily dependent upon the availability of Military Assistance Program funds. The dispatch of the Korean division to Vietnam might affect Military Assistance Program funds, but whether adversely or not could not be predicted. Under consideration was the possibility of using Korean Military Assistance Program funds to finance the readying and dispatch of the division and for the division's support while it was in Vietnam. Early confirmation of mission, bivouac areas, and other routine requirements was dependent upon information from the Commander in Chief, Pacific. The requirement to provide men for a small planning group to determine the organization of the Korean division met with immediate approval.
The request for signal equipment for direct communication between Korea and the Korean division in Vietnam was not approved. Although high-frequency radio equipment was available, the commander of US forces in Korea, General Beach, felt that a better solution was for the Koreans to use the current US communication system on a common-user basis. The commander agreed that the United States should provide transportation for the division but, depending upon the availability of US shipping, certain Korean vessels might have to be used.
The request for financial support to Korean units and individuals in Vietnam met with disapproval. The US commander in Korea did not favor combat duty pay--especially at the same rate paid to US troops-but was in agreement with the payment of an overseas allowance. If the United States had to pay death benefits or make disability payments, the rates should be those presently established under Korean law on a one-time basis only. The United States would not pay directly for the employment of Vietnamese nationals by Korean forces but was in favor of including such expenses in the agreements between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Vietnam. Since the request for four C-123 aircraft appeared to overlap a previous transportation request, the commander felt that the United States should provide only scheduled flights to Korea or reserve spaces on other US scheduled flights for Korean use.
At first glance, the request for a field broadcasting installation appeared to conflict with the psychological warfare programs already in operation in Vietnam, but final resolution of the matter would have to await an on-the-ground opinion.
On 13 July 1965 the US State Department authorized the

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US Ambassador to Korea to offer a number of concessions to the Korean government to insure the prompt deployment of the Korean division to Vietnam. The United States agreed to suspend the Military Assistance Program transfer project for as long as the Korean government maintained substantial forces in Vietnam. The United States also agreed to offshore procurement from Korea for transfer items such as petroleum, oil, lubricants, and construction materials listed in the fiscal year 1966 Military Assistance Program. Subsequently, and during the period of the transfer program, the United States would determine offshore procurement from Korea on the basis of individual items and under normal offshore procurement procedures.
These concessions to the Korean government were made, however, with the understanding that the budgetary savings accruing to Korea from the actions taken would contribute to a substantial military and civil service pay-raise for Koreans. Actually, the Korean government would not incur any additional costs in deploying the division to Vietnam but would secure a number of economic benefits. On the other hand, the cost to the United States for Koreans already in Vietnam approximated $2,000,000 annually, and first year costs for the operation of the Korean division in Vietnam were estimated at $43,000,000.
In a later communication on 16 July 1965, the Commander, US Forces, Korea, informed the Commander in Chief, Pacific, of other decisions that had been made in resolving the Korean requests. With respect to the reduction of US force levels in Korea, the US Commander in Korea and the American Ambassador to Korea, Winthrop D. Brown, prepared a letter assuring the Korean government that President Johnson's earlier decision that there would be no reduction in US force levels remained unchanged, and that any further redeployment of US forces from Korea would be discussed with the Korean government officials beforehand.
By August agreement had been reached with the Korean government on the force structure of the division and support troop augmentation, but the military aspects of control and command and the proposed unified Korean headquarters were still under discussion. Consolidated equipment lists for the Korean division, understrength, and the Marine force, as well as the table of allowances for a Korean field support command had been developed and were to be forwarded to General Westmoreland. In logistics, initial and follow-up support of Class II, IV, and V supplies had been settled, but the matter of Class III supplies could not be resolved until information had been received

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from MACV on the availability and receipt of storage for bulk petroleum products. Class I supplies were still under study. A maintenance policy had been worked out for the evacuation of equipment for rebuild and overhaul. All transportation problems had been solved and, finally, training plans had been completed and disseminated. .
Because of the unpredictable outcome of Korean plans to deploy a division to Vietnam and the urgent need to have another division there, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, informed the Commander in Chief, Pacific, through US Army, Pacific, that if deployment of the Korean division did not take place by 1 November 1965, a US Army division would have to be sent to Vietnam instead. Since planning actions for the movement of a division from either the Pacific command or the continental command would have to be initiated at once, the joint Chiefs of Staff asked Admiral Sharp's opinion on the best means of getting a substitute for the Korean division if the need arose.
Admiral Sharp's view was that the two US divisions then in Korea constituted an essential forward deployment force that should not be reduced. Commitment of the 25th Infantry Division to Vietnam-except for the one-brigade task force requested in the event of an emergency-would deplete Pacific command reserve strength at a critical time. Moreover, the 25th Infantry Division was oriented for deployment to Thailand, and if moved to Vietnam should be replaced immediately with another US division. With deployment of the Korean division to Vietnam, the 25th Infantry Division would be available as a substitute for the Korean division in Korea.
On 19 August 1965 the Korean National Assembly, finally passed a bill authorizing the dispatch of the Korean division. The division was to deploy in three increments: the first on 29 September 1965; the second on 14 October 1965; and the third on 29 October 1965. Initial equipment shortages were not expected to reduce the combat readiness of the division.
Definitive discussion between US and Korean authorities on the dispatch of troops began immediately. As a result, the first combat units, the Republic of Korea's Capital (Tiger) Infantry Division, less one regimental combat team, and the 2d Marine Gores Brigade (Blue Dragon) and supporting elements, totaling 18,212 men, were sent during the period September through November 1965.
The Korean government then sought reassurance that sending troops to Vietnam would neither impair Korean defense nor adversely affect the level of US military assistance to Korea. It

[128]


also sought agreements on the terms of US support for Korean troops in Vietnam. Resulting arrangements between the United States and Korea provided substantially the following terms.
1. No US or Korean force reductions were to take place in Korea without prior consultation.
2. The Korean Military Assistance Program for 1966 was to include an additional $7 million to provide active division equipment for the three Korean Army ready-reserve divisions.
3. Korean forces in Korea were to be modernized in firepower, communications, and mobility.
4. For Korean forces deployed to Vietnam, the United States was to provide equipment, logistical support, construction, training, transportation, subsistence, overseas allowances, funds for any legitimate noncombat claim brought against Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam, in Vietnam, and restitution of losses of the Korean force not resulting from the force's negligence.
General Westmoreland also agreed to provide the Korean force with facilities and services comparable to those furnished US and other allied forces in Vietnam. Korean forces in Vietnam had custody of the equipment funded by the Military Assistance Program brought into Vietnam and equipment funded by the Military Assistance Service and provided by General Westmoreland. Equipment funded by the Military Assistance Program that was battle damaged or otherwise attrited was replaced and title retained by the Republic of Korea. In an emergency redeployment to Korea, the Koreans would take with them all equipment on hand. In a slower deployment or rotation, equipment would be negotiated, particularly that held by Koreans in Vietnam but not compatible with similar equipment held by Korean forces in Korea and items extraneous to the Military Assistance Program.
Prior to the arrival of the Korean division, considerable study of possible locations for its deployment took place. The first plan was to employ the division in the I Corps Tactical Zone, with major elements at Chu Lai, Tam Ky, and Quang Ngai; Korean troops would join with the III Marine Amphibious Force, and perhaps other Free World units to form an international Free World force. Subsequently, this idea was dropped for several reasons. First of all, support of another full division in that area would be difficult logistically because over-the-beach supply would be necessary. Deployment of the division in the I Corps Tactical Zone would also necessitate offensive operations since the enclaves were already adequately secured by elements of the III Marine Amphibious Force. Offensive, operations might, in

[129]


turn, provoke problems of "face" between the two Asian republics, Vietnam and Korea, especially if the Korean forces turned out to be more successful during encounters with the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. There were still several other possible locations at which Korean troops could be stationed. Affecting each of the possibilities were overriding tactical considerations.
The 2d Korean Marine Brigade (the Blue Dragon Brigade) was initially assigned to the Cam Ranh Bay area but did not remain there very long because the security requirements were greater elsewhere. Hence shortly after its arrival the 2d Brigade was moved up to the Tuy Hoa area where the enemy, the 95th Regiment of the North Vietnam Army, had been deployed for several weeks. This enemy unit had been pressing more and more on the population in and around Tuy Hoa and was threatening the government as well as the agriculture of that area.
The Capital Division, affectionately called by the Americans the Tiger Division, arrived at its station about six miles west of Qui Nhon during November 1965, initially with two regiments. The area was chosen, among other reasons, because it was not populated and would therefore not take agricultural land away from the local inhabitants. It was, moreover, high ground that would not be adversely affected by the rains. These circumstances would give the Koreans an opportunity to spread out their command post as much as they wished and allow the first troop units some training in operating against the enemy.
Another reason for not stationing the Capital Division nearer Qui Nhon was that Qui Nhon was to become a major logistic support area, eventually providing the base support for both Korean divisions as well as for the US 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and the 4th Infantry Division. All the land immediately surrounding Qui Nhon, therefore, was to be used for logistical purposes.
Placed as it was in the Qui Nhon area, the Capital Division would be able to move in several critical directions: it could keep Highway 19 open as far as An Khe; it would be close enough to protect the outskirts of Qui Nhon; it could move northward to help clean out the rice-growing area as well as the foothills to the northwest; and it could move southward on Highway 1 toward Tuy Hoa and assist in clearing out the enemy from the populated areas along both sides of the highway.
The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, was sent to the Qui Nhon area prior to the arrival of the Capital Division to insure that the area was protected while the initial Korean units settled down and established camp.

[130]

   
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